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Abstract
Although, the need for an efficient Roma integration policy is growing in Europe,
surprisingly little robust scientific evidence regarding potential policy costs and expected
benefits of alternative policy options has supported the policy design and implementation
so far. The present study attempts to narrow this evidence gap and aims to shed
light on long-run economic, budgetary and fiscal effects of selected education and
employment policies for the inclusion of the marginalised Roma in the EU. We employ
a general equilibrium approach that allows us to assess not only the direct impact of
alternative Roma integration policies but also to capture all induced feedback effects. Our
simulation results suggest that, although Roma integration policies would be costly for
the public budget, in the medium- to long-run, economic, budgetary and fiscal benefits
may significantly outweigh short- to medium-run Roma integration costs. Depending
on the integration policy scenario and the analysed country, the full repayment of the
integration policy investment (positive net present value) may be achieved after 7 to
9 years. In terms of the GDP, employment and earnings, the universal basic income
scenario may have the highest potential, particularly in the medium- to long-run.
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1. Introduction
The marginalisation of Roma is widespread in Europe and takes various forms, it
encompasses almost all aspects of life spanning from education and employment to
health and housing (O’Higgins and Ivanov 2006; FRA 2011; FRA 2018a; FRA 2018b).
In order to improve the Roma situation, there is a strong political willingness and
commitment in the EU (European Parliament 2011). It is surprising however how little
robust scientific evidence regarding potential costs and benefits of Roma integration
policies has supported the policy design and implementation so far.
To narrow this evidence gap and provide policy makers with the missing scientific
evidence, the present study undertakes a comparative analysis of long-term economic,
budgetary and fiscal costs and benefits of alternative Roma integration policies in the
areas of education and employment in five EU Member States with the largest share of
the Roma population – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania.1
We employ a general equilibrium approach that allows us to assess not only the direct
impact of selected Roma integration policies but also to capture all induced feedback
effects.
In the five studied EU Member States from the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) live
around 4 million Roma (Council of Europe 2012). Many Roma communities are among
the most socially and economically marginalised groups in these countries; they perform
worse than the mainstream society in almost all socio-economic spheres of life, being
relegated to the fringe of society. On average, Roma are found to have lower income level,
higher poverty rate regardless of the poverty metrics applied (Ivanov and Kagin 2014),
higher unemployment rate (FRA 2018b), they are less educated, face higher incidence
of undernourishment, have lower life expectancy, higher child mortality, less access to
drinking water, sanitation and electricity, etc. (O’Higgins and Ivanov 2006; Kertesi and
Kézdi 2011).
These evident and sizeable well-being differences between Roma and the mainstream
population make the Roma inclusion issue high on the policy agenda in EU Member
States. The key priorities of inclusion policies include the integration of Roma into the
schooling system, labour markets and improving access to social services and infrastruc-
ture (Achim 2004; Ringold, Orenstein and Wilkens 2005; Ciaian and Kancs 2016). At
the European level, two policy initiatives (and policy frameworks) highlight the political
1In the present study we neglect impacts on humanitarian, human right and many social issues, the
positive impact of which is uncontested though.
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importance of the Roma inclusion: the Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005-2015), and the
EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies (2011-2020). Similarly important
is the Paris Declaration,2 which aims at mobilising the education system to prevent
and tackle marginalisation, intolerance, racism and radicalisation, and to preserve a
framework of equal opportunities for all, including an inclusive education for all chil-
dren, independent of the social background. Further, the European Commission has
increased its policy support under the European Semester of the Europe 2020 strategy,
and has linked the EU funding to the policy implementation. For example, in 2016 the
European Commission issued Country Specific Recommendations to improve access
to the schooling and employment of Roma in five EU Member States with most acute
marginalisation challenges, i.e. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and
Slovakia. In addition, there is also legislation for fighting discrimination against Roma
(the Racial Equality Directive),3 as well as European Structural and Investment Funds can
be used for the Roma inclusion in the EU.4 At the national level, policy instruments in-
clude targeted national Roma integration strategies and measures, reforms of mainstream
policies impacting Roma and the enforcement of an anti-discrimination legislation. Both
national and EU funds are being used either for Roma-targeted measures or for inclusive
mainstream reforms (European Commission 2018).
Despite of a growing demand for and supply of Roma integration policies, the existing
evidence base supporting the design, implementation and evaluation of Roma integration
policies is scarce and inconclusive. On the one hand, there are only few studies in
the scientific literature looking at these questions systematically. On the other hand,
the few existing studies apply at most a partial equilibrium approach or undertake
a reduced form analysis to estimate costs and benefits of Roma integration policies.
For example, Kertesi and Kézdi (2006) have estimated long-term budgetary effects of
investments in Roma children in the secondary education in Hungary. Bogdanov and
Angelov (2007) have estimated costs and benefits of an improved education of Roma
in Bulgaria. Marcincˇin and Marcincˇinová (2009) and a team of the World Bank experts
have conducted a similar analysis for Slovakia (World Bank 2012). There have been also
2Declaration on promoting citizenship and the common values of freedom, tolerance and non-
discrimination through education adopted by the Commissioner Navracsics and Education Ministers
in 2015, see https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/eurydice/images/1/14/Leaflet_Paris_
Declaration.pdf.
3Council Directive 2000/43/EC, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:
32000L0043
4ESIF Investment priority 9(ii) ’Integration of marginalised communities such as the Roma’.
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attempts to estimate economic and fiscal costs and benefits of the Roma inclusion in the
labour market in the Czech Republic and Romania. Despite providing some evidence,
an important limitation of reduced form / partial equilibrium analyses is that they do
not take into account economy-wide interactions and medium- to long-run feedback
effects and adjustments on labour markets. As result, without accounting for all direct
and indirect rebound effects provides only a partial and/or biased picture of true policy
effects.
In order to narrow this evidence gap, the present study undertakes a holistic analysis
of long-run economic, budgetary and fiscal costs and benefits of selected Roma inclusion
policies in five EU countries from the CEE: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Slovakia and Romania. We have selected these five countries, because more than two
thirds of the total EU Roma population reside in these EU Member States. The second
reason for choosing these countries is that the Roma marginalisation is particularly
widespread and represent an acute and rapidly growing socio-economic problem in these
countries (see section 2). They cause frictions not only at the national level, but may
also have EU-wide implications, e.g. through migration (Halasz 2009; Korando 2012).
From the EU policy perspective, these five countries are the only EU Member States with
country specific recommendations regarding Roma issued by the European Commission.
By complementing previous findings, the current study undertakes a comparative
analysis of long-run economic, budgetary and fiscal impacts of alternative Roma inte-
gration policies by following the modelling approach of Tanaka et al. (2018) and Kancs
and Lecca 2018) implemented for the five EU Member States. This modelling framework
allows us to undertake a holistic analysis of long-run social, economic and fiscal impacts
of alternative Roma integration policies. The modelling of education is based on Tanaka
et al. (2018), who propose an education model in the context if immigrants versus natives
with two channels of adjustment: the education quantity and quality. Given that Roma
are long-term immigrants with important differences in educational attainment rates and
in the education quality with respect to the mainstream population in host countries,
we adopt this approach in the present study. The labour market is modelled following
Bonacich (1975), who proposes a split labour market between migrant and native workers.
The empirical implementation of the split labour market follows Kancs and Lecca (2018).
The adopted general equilibrium framework has important advantages over alterna-
tive methods in the context of our study. As summarised by the OECD (1986):
"The most important strength of the general equilibrium methodology is its solid
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microeconomic foundation, which precludes ad-hoc specification and makes the model
structure more transparent. The theoretical foundation of such models makes it
possible to trace back, in every case, the simulation results and determine which
factors are crucial in explaining them."
"Moreover, the general equilibrium models ensure the internal consistency of the
analysis. This makes general equilibrium models extremely useful in the case of
economy-wide policy issues with many ramifications, sometimes acting in opposite
directions, and generating feedback effects which are crucial to the final result."
In collaboration with Roma experts and policy makers in the EU, we have designed
two alternative Roma integration policy scenarios and assess long-run economic, bud-
getary and fiscal effects. In addition to assessing the impacts of Roma integration policy
initiatives currently being planned/implemented in the five EU Member States, we also
design and simulate a hypothetical – universal basic income – scenario, where the same
amount of public funding for the Roma integration is disbursed in form of direct cash
transfers. According to the existing evidence (Aizer et al. 2016; Nikiforos et al. 2017,
Kela 2018; Pareliussen et al. 2018; Jones and Marinescu 2018; Marinescu 2018), there
are good reasons to believe that providing direct cash transfers to poor/marginalised
households, such as Roma, may be the preferred policy option over complex supply-side
programs conditioned on many factors. Indeed, Roma integration policies that attempt
to increase the supply of certain public services, e.g. education, are often being criticised:
key drivers of low educational attainment rates are not tackled, private costs of Roma
households often exceed social benefits, wrong incentives are created and high admin-
istrative costs imposed that significantly reduce the net amounts actually arriving at
Roma households.5 Also, supply-driven programs tend to reflect donor’s understanding
the challenges Roma are facing, which may diverge from the reality on the ground.
In the long-run, this top-down approach facilitated by layers of intermediaries makes
participatory approaches more difficult to implement ultimately encouraging a culture of
dependency of the communities commonly referred to as ‘target groups’ (FRA 2018c).
For these and other reasons, direct cash transfers to poor households and marginalised
communities are being increasingly implemented not only in developing but also in
5Among others, discussions during the European Commission’s workshop on Roma communities
in Europe "Taking stock of current science-based knowledge and what is needed for effective policy
development".
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developed countries, such as the USA, Canada and Finland (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2004;
Bassett 2008; Kela 2018).
Our simulation results suggest that, although the Roma integration e.g. by providing
targeted education assistance services and reducing the labour market discrimination
would be costly for the public budget, in the medium- to long-run, economic, budgetary
and fiscal benefits may significantly outweigh short- to medium-run Roma integration
costs. Depending on the integration policy scenario and the analysed country, the annual
long-run GDP effect would be between 16.47 and 109.93 million Euro above the baseline
growth, and the full repayment of the integration policy investment (positive net present
value) would be achieved after 7 to 9 years. In terms of the GDP, employment and
earnings, the universal basic income scenario clearly outperforms currently implemented
Roma integration policies, particularly in the medium- to long-run.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a brief
background of the Roma population in Europe and summarises the socio-economic
situation of Roma in the five study countries. Section 3 sketches the underlying modelling
framework, whereas section 4 details the construction of alternative policy scenarios and
main assumptions behind each of them. Section 5 presents simulation results, whereas
the final section concludes.
2. Roma in Europe: A historical background and current situation
2.1. Historical background
Since their arrival in Europe in the 15-16th century, Roma have faced various types of
discrimination by the mainstream society lasting for many centuries. Throughout the
centuries, the concept of otherness was (and still is) shaping the relationships between
the Roma and the surrounding (Gadzo) societies. Both Roma and non-Roma looked at
the others as dangerous, putting own group’s identity at risk. In the case of the Roma,
the hostility on the side of the Gadzo and the factual exclusion of Roma was augmented
by the Roma’s implicit resistance to engage with the disciplining structures of sedentary
societies and their non-Roma hierarchies, both cleric and secular. The process intensified
with the consolidation of nation-states in the 19th and 20th century (Ivanov 2012).
The discriminatory attitudes against Roma that were later incorporated in the public
legislation and regulations in Europe have varied between countries and over time and
have included, among others, banishment to enter and stay in countries, expulsion,
deportation, imprisonment, forced labour, death penalty without trial on the grounds of
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being Roma, banishment of certain occupations (e.g. trade), confiscations of possessions,
forceful taking of Roma children from families and placing them in non-Roma families,
forced assimilation and integration, deportation to colonies and enslavement in several
parts of Europe. One of the worst records in the European history of Roma occurred
during the World War II, when Roma were subject to deportations and mass executions,
similar to Jews. Historians estimate that 220,000 to 600,000 Roma were killed by Nazis
and their collaborators, in other words, between 22% and 60% of the around 1 million
Roma in Europe at the time. The biggest losses in Roma lives were recorded in CEE
countries, particularly in Romania and Hungary (Fraser 1995; Hancock 2005; Holocaust
Encyclopedia 2016; Ciaian and Kancs 2016).
After the World War II, the attitude of state authorities towards Roma started to
change. The countries of Central and Eastern Europa (the former socialist block) adopted
a class-based approach addressing Roma integration in the context of ‘elevating’ inferior
groups to proletariat status trough full employment – in the case of Roma, mostly in
heavy industry and agriculture. In the Western Europe, the approach was based on
respect to individual rights and minority integration gradually became one of the EU
policy paradigms to address the challenges of social and economic marginalisation.
Since 2010 the marginalisation of Roma is seen as violation of fundamental rights and
not merely as socio-economic vulnerability prompting the active involvement of the
European Commission in Roma integration (EC 2011). Since then, inclusion policies in
the EU seek to integrate Roma into the mainstream society, i.e. in the schooling system,
labour markets and improve access to social services. In contrast, countries under the
Communist regime followed a different path, as a forced assimilation remained to be the
main government policy paradigm, e.g. sterilisation of Roma women in Czechoslovakia,
taking away Roma children from their families and destruction of Roma villages in
Hungary; assimilation policy in Romania. Only after the fall of the Communist regime in
around 1990, CEE countries started to adopt a more integrated approach towards Roma
(Achim 2004; Ringold, Orenstein and Wilkens 2005; Ciaian and Kancs 2016).
Even though the anti-Roma discrimination by state authorities has reduced signifi-
cantly during last decades, it has not been eliminated completely in Europe. Discrimina-
tory attitudes of state authorities against Roma can still be observed in many European
countries, particularly in the Central and Eastern Europe. The most widespread forms of
the anti-Roma discrimination are linked to ethnic bias in the provision of various public
institutions and/or the way regulations are implemented and/or enforced by central,
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regional and local authorities. Examples of the formal anti-Roma discrimination taking
place in CEE countries include an abusive behaviour of police towards Roma, failure of
the justice system to investigate racist abuses, forced evictions, an unequal treatment of
Roma children by the mainstream schooling system, e.g. segregation, abusive behaviour
of teachers, inferior education, failure of official authorities to take active actions (stand)
against racist attitudes towards Roma, etc. (Petrova 2004; Mudde 2005; Cviklova 2015;
Ciaian and Kancs 2016).
In addition, various extremist and radical political parties (active in almost all Eu-
ropean countries) exploit the anti-Roma attitudes fuelling them further. Many of these
political parties legitimise their existence and build their political capital by prototyping
minorities as a burden to the mainstream society and as a cause of societal problems.
Roma and immigrants are among the most common targets of extremist and radical
political parties in Europe to gain votes and the political power (Halasz 2009; Stewart
2012; Ram 2014; Ciaian and Kancs 2016).
Despite discriminations and genocides in past, Roma is one of the largest ethnic
minorities in Europe nowadays. Although, the exact size of the Roma population is
notoriously hard to estimate, because statistical data by the ethnic origin are not collected
in an accurate and systematic way (mostly due to privacy reasons), their size in Europe
is estimated between 11 and 20 million. In the EU, Roma population is estimated to
be between 4 and 8 million (Barany 2002; Council of Europe 2012; Ringold et al. 2005).
Most of European Roma (around 80%) live in former communist countries in the CEE;
Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania have the largest Roma populations in Europe.
The share of Roma in the total population is close to 10% in Bulgaria, around 9% in
Slovakia and Romania and 7% in Hungary, followed by the Czech Republic. More than
one third of European Roma live in these five CEE countries, whereas the share of Roma
account for more than two thirds of all Roma in the EU.
Finally, it is important to note that Roma is one of the fastest growing population
groups in Europe at the beginning of the 21st century, with an increasing share of the
Roma population being comprised of youth: 36% of the Roma population are under 15
compared to 16% of the overall population in Europe. The average age is 25 years among
Roma, compared to around 40 years among non-Roma (Fundacion Secretariado Gitano
2009; Roma Education Fund 2004). Particularly in the CEE, Roma represent a significant
and growing share of the school age population and therefore the future workforce.
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2.2. Socio-economic situation of Roma in study countries
The social and economic deprivation of Roma is widespread in all five studied
countries and takes various forms, it encompasses almost all aspects of life spanning
from educational, economic (e.g. labour market, income) to social (e.g. housing, health)
and infrastructure (e.g. Cret¸an and Turnock 2009; Kézdi and Suranyi 2009; Kertesi and
Kézdi 2011; O’Higgins 2012; Brüggemann 2012; Mihailov 2012; Peric´ 2012; Ivanov and
Kagin 2014; Cviklova 2015). However, not all Roma households are marginalised. In order
to identify the share of marginalised Roma (and non-Roma) households, we adopt the
UNDP’s social exclusion index (Peleah and Ivanov 2013). The UNDP index contains three
dimensions, each being described by 8 indicators (24 in total). Given that the primary
focus of our study are those policy interventions that improve the educational and
employment situation of economic and social dimensions, we adopt narrower definition
of marginalisation in our analysis.6 According to this adjusted definition of the UNDP’s
social exclusion index, a Roma adult is considered as ‘socio-economically excluded’ if it
has accumulated deprivations in these indicators: (i) adults with a not completed upper
secondary education; (ii) being an unemployed (or a discouraged worker).7 For Roma
children, we use one socio-economic indicator: (iii) children of compulsory school-age not
attending school. These three key indicators are complemented by four further indicators:
(iv) children with/without a pre-school education; (v) illiteracy; (vi) paid employment;
and (vii) at risk of poverty. We use the FRA / European Commission’s survey data to
compute the three marginalisation indicators.8
Children with preschool education. Education problems of Roma are pervasive at all
stages of education. The gap between Roma and non-Roma in accessing the education
system starts already with the preschool education. The European Union Agency for
Fundamental Rights (FRA) and European Commission’s 2011 survey conducted in
selected EU countries among Roma and non-Roma which share a similar environment
reveals a significant gap in the preschool attendance between Roma and the mainstream
population. In contrast to 87%-96% of similar non-Roma, only 44% of Roma aged 6-15
6In the original UNDP definition of the social exclusion person is considered as ‘socially excluded’ if it
has accumulated 9 or more deprivations from the 24 indicators.
7The original UNDP labelling for three of these indicators – (i) Household with young children not in
school or pre-school, (ii) Low educational achievements (basic schooling) and early school leavers; (iii)
Being unemployed or a discouraged worker – has been adjusted to match them more precisely with those
available in the European Commission’s 2011 survey data.
8Data from 2011 Roma survey are accessible from the FRA’s online data explorer: http://fra.europa.
eu/en/publications-and-resources/data-and-maps?mdq1=theme&mdq2=3508
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Figure 1: Socio-economic characteristics of Roma in Bulgaria, percent of respondents. Sources: Children
with preschool education (age group 6-15); Children of compulsory school age not attending school
in 2010/2011; Adults with not completed upper secondary education (age group between 18-24); Self
perceived illiteracy (age group 16 and above): FRA (2014c); Paid employment (age group 16 and above)
(including full-time, part-time, ad-hoc jobs, self-employment): FRA (2014a); Self-perceived unemployment:
FRA (2011); At risk of poverty (below 60 % of the national median): FRA (2014b).
in the Czech Republic, 48% in Slovakia, 55% in Romania and 64% in Bulgaria had ever
attended the preschool education (Figures 1, 2, 4 and 5). Although, in Hungary the
preschool education participation of Roma is somewhat higher, it is still below that of a
similar non-Roma population 3. The very low preschool attendance indicates that Roma
children will likely face difficulties to catch up with non-Roma at subsequent schooling
stages (primary and secondary education) and thus represents an important cause of the
early school drop-out (European Commission 2012; FRA 2014a).
Children not attending school. The FRA / European Commission’s 2011 survey results
also reveal important differences in the compulsory school attendance (at the age between
7 and 15) between Roma and non-Roma children in the five studied countries: between
5% and 22% of the Roma children aged 7 to 15 are not attending the compulsory school
education compared to between 0% and 6% of non-Roma children. According to Figures
1 and 4, the school attendance gap is particularly sizeable in Bulgaria and Romania,
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Figure 2: Socio-economic characteristics of Roma in the Czech Republic, percent of respondents. Sources:
Children with preschool education (age group 6-15); Children of compulsory school age not attending
school in 2010/2011; Adults with not completed upper secondary education (age group between 18-24);
Self perceived illiteracy (age group 16 and above): FRA (2014c); Paid employment (age group 16 and above)
(including full-time, part-time, ad-hoc jobs, self-employment): FRA (2014a); Self-perceived unemployment:
FRA (2011); At risk of poverty (below 60 % of the national median): FRA (2014b).
where respectively 12% and 22% of Roma children in the compulsory school age are not
attending a compulsory school education either because they are still in preschool, not
yet in education, skipped the year, stopped school completely or are already working
(European Commission 2012; FRA 2014a).
Not completed upper secondary education. With respect to the upper secondary education,
the FRA / European Commission’s 2011 survey results suggest that only a fraction of
Roma children have completed the upper secondary education compared to non-Roma
in the five study countries. Between 72% and 93% of Roma in the age group between 18
to 24 have not completed the upper secondary education compared to between 7% and
50% of non-Roma in the five study countries. The secondary education situation of Roma
is particularly alarming in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where educational
gaps to the mainstream population are more than 50%. For example, in Slovakia only 7%
of Roma have completed the upper secondary education, compared to 83% of non-Roma.
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Figure 3: Socio-economic characteristics of Roma in Hungary, percent of respondents. Sources: Children
with preschool education (age group 6-15); Children of compulsory school age not attending school
in 2010/2011; Adults with not completed upper secondary education (age group between 18-24); Self
perceived illiteracy (age group 16 and above): FRA (2014c); Paid employment (age group 16 and above)
(including full-time, part-time, ad-hoc jobs, self-employment): FRA (2014a); Self-perceived unemployment:
FRA (2011); At risk of poverty (below 60 % of the national median): FRA (2014b).
Illiteracy. The illiteracy rate of Roma aged 16 and above is between 4% and 31%
compared to 1% or less for non-Roma in the five study countries. The illiteracy rate
is particularly high in Romania (31%) and Bulgaria (15%) (Figures 1 and 4) (European
Commission 2012; FRA 2014a). The very high illiteracy rate of Roma is both cause
and implication of their socio-economic marginalisation. According to UNESCO (2010),
illiteracy not only limits the full development of individuals and their participation in so-
ciety, but also has repercussions throughout life, affecting a person’s family environment,
restricting access to the benefits of development, and hindering the enjoyment of other
human rights.
Paid employment. Roma are significantly worse off also on labour markets compared
to non-Roma, particularly in terms of the employment share. According to the FRA /
European Commission’s 2011 survey, in the five studied countries only 21% to 34% of
Roma aged 15 and above were in a paid employment (including full-time, part-time,
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Figure 4: Socio-economic characteristics of Roma in Romania, percent of respondents. Sources: Children
with preschool education (age group 6-15); Children of compulsory school age not attending school
in 2010/2011; Adults with not completed upper secondary education (age group between 18-24); Self
perceived illiteracy (age group 16 and above): FRA (2014c); Paid employment (age group 16 and above)
(including full-time, part-time, ad-hoc jobs, self-employment): FRA (2014a); Self-perceived unemployment:
FRA (2011); At risk of poverty (below 60 % of the national median): FRA (2014b).
ad-hoc jobs, self-employment) compared to between 35% and 60% of non-Roma that
share a similar environment. For example, in Slovakia only 21% of the surveyed Roma
were in a paid employment, compared 53% of a similar non-Roma population (Figure 5).
A significant gap – of more than 20% in a paid employment between similar Roma and
non-Roma – is also observed in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic (Figures 1 and 2) (FRA
2012c).
Even when Roma are in paid employment, they often have to rely on seasonal and
occasional type of jobs (Troc 2002; O’Higgins and Ivanov 2006). According to the FRA
/ European Commission’s 2011 survey, only between 34% and 81% of Roma in paid
employment have full-time jobs in the five study countries, while the rest of Roma
in a paid employment face precarious employment conditions, i.e. hold ad-hoc jobs,
are self-employed and are employed part-time. Two thirds of those who are in a paid
employment do not have a full time job (4) (FRA 2012c).
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Figure 5: Socio-economic characteristics of Roma in Slovakia, percent of respondents. Sources: Children
with preschool education (age group 6-15); Children of compulsory school age not attending school
in 2010/2011; Adults with not completed upper secondary education (age group between 18-24); Self
perceived illiteracy (age group 16 and above): FRA (2014c); Paid employment (age group 16 and above)
(including full-time, part-time, ad-hoc jobs, self-employment): FRA (2014a); Self-perceived unemployment:
FRA (2011); At risk of poverty (below 60 % of the national median): FRA (2014b).
Unemployment. Regarding the unemployment rate in the five study countries, the
FRA / European Commission’s 2011 survey revealed that between 30% and 45% of
Roma were unemployed; which is more than two times higher compared to a similar
non-Roma population. In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia, the Roma
unemployment rate was between 3 to 6 times higher than that of a comparable non-Roma
population (Figures 1, 2, 4 and 5) (FRA 2011).
Based on the UNDP Roma survey results conducted in CEE countries in 2002 and
2004, O’Higgins and Ivanov (2006) have found that most Roma suffered from a long-term
unemployment. While in the 2002 survey, more than half (51%) of the unemployed Roma
were without job since 1996 or earlier, in the 2004 survey, the average share of those
without job since 1996 has increased to 64% (ranging from 55% in Bulgaria to 88% in
Romania). A further effect of the long-term unemployment is reflected also in the fact
that many Roma are not eligible for unemployment benefits and must rely among others
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on a minimal social assistance.
Further, O’Higgins and Ivanov (2006) have found that Roma unemployment rates
decrease with the educational attainment level, a fact which is known also from the
mainstream population. However, survey results reveal that unemployment rates among
Roma fall much slower with the educational attainment level than among non-Roma
living in a close proximity to Roma. This discrepancy between Roma and non-Roma
indicates a presence of an anti-Roma discrimination in the labour market. According to
O’Higgins and Ivanov (2006), among others, this contributes to explaining the fact that
the early school leaving of Roma pupils is larger than of non-Roma children, as the gains
from education (schooling premium) are considerably smaller for Roma. However, this
may also indicate lower quality education attained by Roma for the same grade, as many
Roma tend to attend lower quality schools and/or segregated classes.
Risk of poverty. According to the FRA / European Commission’s 2011 survey, the large
majority of Roma households (more than 78%) have an income level below the national
risk-of-poverty level (i.e. lower than 60% of the national median disposable income),
compared to less than 49% of similar non- Roma households in the five study countries
(Figures 1 – 5). This latter figure represents a poverty risk significantly above the average
rate at the national level. The poverty risk is positively correlated with the household
size, though the variation between household sizes is relatively small (FRA 2014b).
Kertesi and Kézdi (2011) have identified a significant wage gap between Roma and
non-Roma in Hungary in surveys conducted between 1993 and 2007. According to
their results, differences in observable characteristics, e.g. the educational background
and geographic isolation, explain 40% of the wage gap between the employed Roma
and non-Roma, whereas the rest of the wage gap has to be attributed to differences in
unobserved skills and the anti-Roma discrimination on the labour market.
2.3. Education quality
When thinking about fundamental differences in the educational attainment between
Roma and non-Roma children, it is useful to distinguish between two broad types of
education pathways:9 (i) Vocational education – education pathway leading to an appren-
ticeship; and (ii) general education – education pathway finishing with a matriculation
examination (matura).10
9Note that in reality there are many more types of education pathways possible in the five studied CEE
countries and there is a certain mobility between the two broad types identified in the present study.
10A type of a matriculation examination exists in each of the five studied CEE countries.
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The apprenticeship education pathway implies finishing a primary school plus a
vocational training. Hence, apprenticeship is the lower standard of a school education
qualification: it is less demanding for children (and their parents), but usually also labour
market outcomes are lower. There are several types of schools offering education that
finishes with this lower standard of qualification: practical schools, vocational schools,
etc. In the context of Roma, also special schools and segregated schools are relevant,
as they all do not lead to the matura exam. For example, in the Czech Republic there
are ’mainstream schools with special educational programmes for pupils with special
education needs’, which are more commonly referred to as ’practical schools’. According
to European Parliament (2011), 27 percent of Roma children attend these practical schools,
which is in stark contrast with 2 percent of children from the mainstream population.
According to Stejskalova (2012), these practical schools are the preferred option by many
Roma households. First, in these schools parents are only little involved and taken
as responsible for their child’s education and homework preparation. Second, these
practical schools are usually located in a close neighbourhood of Roma communities,
implying lower transport/commuting costs for children to attend school. Third, because
the majority of classmates are from disadvantageous families, children in these schools
experience less discrimination from peers. On the other hand, the education quality
in these practical schools is considerably lower than in regular schools. According to
European Parliament (2011), 65 percent of Roma pupils who follow the practical school
educational pathway finish school with the lower standard of qualification (secondary
school with apprenticeship) and less than one percent of Roma pupils graduate with the
highest form of qualification – matura.
The matura education pathway implies finishing a primary school plus a secondary
school with a matriculation examination. Hence, mature is the higher standard of a
school education qualification: it is more demanding for children (and their parents),
but usually also labour market outcomes are higher. A matriculation examination is
taken at the end of the secondary education, and generally must be passed in order
to apply to a university or other institutions of higher education. After passing the
matriculation examination, students receive a school leaving certificate, which allows
them to matriculate at university and take up their studies. In other words, completing a
secondary school with a matriculation examination makes a higher education possible.
There are different types of schools leading to the matura exam, they vary from country
to country: high schools, gymnasiums, lyceums, upper schools, etc.
15
According to the Roma Education Fund (2018), around 46% of Roma children attend
special schools in the CEE, which compares to just below 5% of children of the mainstream
society (see also Kertesi and Kezdi 2011). Hence, there are important differences not only
in educational attainment rates between Roma and non-Roma, but also in the quality of
the received education.
3. Modelling framework
As noted in introduction, the existing evidence base supporting the design and
implementation of Roma integration policies is scarce and inconclusive. The few existing
studies estimating costs and benefits of Roma integration policies apply at most a partial
equilibrium approach or undertake a reduced form analysis. A key limitation of reduced
form / partial equilibrium analyses, which are being used to assess Roma integration
policies, is that they do not take into account economy-wide interactions and medium-
to long-run feedback effects and adjustments on labour markets. For example, usually,
they assume that policy-induced investments in the human capital of Roma would not
change wages and employment probabilities of the mainstream population. Justifications
for such rather limiting assumptions are provided by evidence that Roma are minorities
in countries where they reside and their share in the total labour force is relatively
small. However, from the dual labour market theory (e.g. Dickens and Lang 1985) we
know that an integration policy that would improve the labour market participation and
employment of the economically inactive population would shift the labour supply, which
in turn would affect labour market outcomes in the medium- to long-run. Furthermore,
the inclusion of Roma into labour markets is expected to generate more economic activity,
which will affect demand, the tax revenue of government, etc. Although, both types of
general equilibrium effects affect the overall costs and benefits of the Roma integration
policy in the medium- to long-run, they are not accounted for in reduced form / partial
equilibrium analyses.
Capturing general equilibrium feedback effects and the above discussed sizeable
differences between Roma and non-Roma in education and labour markets pose chal-
lenges to the analytical framework. First, the model must be able to identify Roma
and non-Roma children in education and workers on the labour market separately, as
section 2 suggests sizeable differences between the two population groups. Second, the
modelling framework should be able to capture all short- and long-run policy-induced
general equilibrium feedback effects on labour markets, public budget, etc. Third, the
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modelling framework should allow for an integration policy-induced social mobility.
Taking these aspects into consideration, in the present study we follow the modelling
approach of Tanaka et al. (2018) and Kancs and Lecca 2018) that allows us to undertake
a holistic analysis of long-run social, economic and fiscal impacts of alternative Roma
integration policies. The modelling of education and labour markets is less traditional,
therefore, all key equations are presented and discussed in detail. The rest of the under-
lying model (firms, government, equilibrium conditions) is rather standard, therefore,
it’s description is kept concise. The modelling of education is based on Tanaka et al.
(2018), who propose an education model in the context if immigrants versus natives
with two channels of adjustment: the education quantity and quality. Given that all
main results of this model apply also to Roma (who share key patterns of exclusion and
discrimination based on social constructs and prejudice because of their ’otherness’),
we adopt the Tanaka et al. (2018) approach in the present study. The labour market
is modelled following Bonacich (1975), who proposes a split labour market between
migrant and native workers (see Kancs and Lecca 2018).
The adopted general equilibrium framework offers several advantages in our study,
compared to partial equilibrium and reduced form methods. According to the European
Commission’s Better Regulation Toolbox (p.359), 11 a general equilibrium framework,
which captures linkages between markets across the entire economy, is the most appropri-
ate when indirect impacts are likely to be the most significant ones in terms of magnitude
of expected impacts:
"General equilibrium models are able to simulate the shifts in supply curves and
corresponding demand changes that can result from any change in the economy,
from a price shock in raw materials to a new form of price regulation. Accordingly,
they are able to model the links between connected markets in a way that shows the
ultimate impact on outputs and consumption of goods and services in the new market
equilibrium; and they can also determine a new set of prices and demands for various
production factors (labour, capital, land). As a final result, they can also provide
indications and estimates as regards macroeconomic changes, such as GDP, overall
demand, etc." Better Regulation Toolbox (p.359)
11https://ec.europa.eu/info/better-regulation-guidelines-and-toolbox_en
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3.1. Overview of the model12
Key economic ’agents’ in the model are households, firms and government; key
production factors are different types of labour and capital. The model economy is
represented by five EU Member States: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia
and Romania, the rest of the EU and the rest of the world. Being a general equilibrium,
the model captures all flows of goods and services of the global economy in the base
year. Through international trade linkages, the model covers also the rest of the world,
which for the sake of simplicity is modelled in a fairly aggregated way though.
Each EU Member State’s economy is composed of a number of economic sectors,
the supply of educational services representing one such sector.13 Each economic sector
produces goods or services for the intermediate and final use by combining inputs from
materials, capital and labour according to a nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES) production function framework. In each sector goods are either vertically dif-
ferentiated (education services) or horizontally differentiated (all other sectors).14 In
sectors producing horizontally differentiated goods, the competition between firms is
monopolistic, implying that many small firms offer similar products or services, which
however are not perfect substitutes. Barriers to entry and exit in each economic sector
are sufficiently low, such that the production/pricing decision of any one firm does not
directly affect those of its competitors. The equilibrium nature of the model implies that
all revenues from the production of goods and services are allocated either to households
(as returns to labour or capital), to other industries as payments for the intermediate
output, or to government as taxes.
The demand for goods and services produced in all economies stems from households,
firms in the same or other sectors and the public sector (government). As usual, the
government budget (net of taxes, subsidies, transfers and savings) is allocated among
different commodities according to a CES utility function.
12See Appendix for a formal description of the model.
13The SAM data set to which the model is calibrated provides a considerable flexibility to re-aggregate
the model into different sectoral groupings, which we exploit intensively in a sensitivity analysis, in order
to assess impacts on low-tech versus high-tech sectors, skill-intensive versus skill-extensive sectors, etc.
In the this study we employ a five sector version of the model: Low-skill manufacturing; Medium-skill
manufacturing; High-skill manufacturing; Education and the Rest of the economy (see Appendix for details
of the sectoral classification).
14See Lutz and Turrini (2006) for vertically differentiated skills.
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3.2. Education
Each of the five EU Member State is populated by heterogenous households. Following
Tanaka et al. (2018), households are differentiated according to their ethnic origin, f , that
include mainstream society’s households and Roma households. Households between
different ethnic origin groups differ with respect to the number of children, the preference
for education, costs of education (opportunity costs of a child labour in household) and
the disposable income.
Following Tanaka et al. (2018), households have a nested utility structure, where at
the top level, household with the ethnical background, f , derive utility, u f , from the
consumption of horizontally differentiated consumption goods and services, C, and from
vertically differentiated education services, E f (in per-child units):15
u f =
1
α
(C)α︸ ︷︷ ︸
Consumption goods
+
γ f
α
(
E f
)α︸ ︷︷ ︸
Educaiton services
(1)
where α < 1 is parameter determining the share of the aggregate income devoted to
education by the government, that is, and implicit tax rate determining the tax elasticity
of demand for educational services, and γ f > 0 is a preference parameter for education
relative to consumption that is common to all households from the same ethnic group.
As regards consumption goods, see Appendix for a description of the household
consumption behaviour. As regards education services, at the second tier households
decide on a particular education quality from a range of vertically differentiated education
services, each firm in the education sector supplying a different quality education services.
All firms in the education sector receive a per-student subsidy from government, denoted
by b ≥ 0. This education subsidy constitutes a public cost of education that is financed
through taxes, t. In addition, households face also a private cost of education, e.g. school
fees, z f ≥ 0, that are education quality-specific: higher quality education costs more to
households and vice versa. Households choose their preferred education quality among
a range of vertically differentiated education services indexed by the quality premium,
z f . The household indirect utility can then be rewritten as:
u f = max
z f≥0
1
α
(
y f (1− t)− c f n f z f
)α
+
γ f
α
(
b + z f
)α (2)
15Country subscripts are omitted in this section for the sake of brevity.
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which is increasing in the disposable (net of taxes, t) household income, y f , and education
units (quality), b + z f . The household utility is decreasing in education costs, c f n f z f ,
where c f captures ethnic origin-specific education costs that are not related to schools,
e.g. the opportunity cost of a child labour in household or cost of additional language
courses that are not equal/relevant for all ethnic groups, e.g. the mainstream population.
Whereas b is an exogenous policy variable, z f is an endogenous decision variable of
households.
Following Tanaka et al. (2018), from equation (2) the utility-maximising education
quality, z f , chosen by household with f ethnical background, n number of children and y
income level can be expressed as:
z f =
y f (1− t)−
(
γ f
c f n f
) 1
α−1
(
γ f
c f n f
) 1
α−1
+ c f n f
(3)
According to equation (3), households with higher disposable income, y f (1− t), or
ethnic groups with higher taste for education, γ f , will choose higher quality education
that is more expensive. In contrast, households with more children, n f , or facing higher
opportunity costs of sending children to school, c f , will choose relatively lower quality
education that is less expensive.
This adopted education modelling framework of Tanaka et al. (2018) allows us to
capture fundamental education differences between Roma and non-Roma in the five
CEE study countries. On average, Roma households have lower level of income and
more children than non-Roma households (see Ciaian and Kancs 2018). According to the
FRA / European Commission’s 2011 survey data, Roma children have lower educational
attainment compared to non-Roma children both in terms of quality and quantity. Third,
the education demand of Roma households is decreasing in opportunity costs e.g. of
the child labour in household. In contrast, higher preference for education of non-Roma
households contributes to higher educational outcomes. Further, the quality of education
positively affects the returns to education. According to Castelló-Climent and Hidalgo-
Cabrillana (2012), there are increasing marginal returns to the education quality. Hence,
a further implicit result of the model is that those households that choose lower quality
schools will have lower marginal returns to education and vice versa.
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3.3. Labour markets
Households own production factors – capital and labour – which they rent to firms.
Labour is disaggregated according to skill levels into three categories: low-skill (primary
and lower secondary education, ISCED 0-2); medium-skill (upper-secondary and post-
secondary education ISCED 3-4); and high-skill: (tertiary education, ISCED 5-6). Net wage
differences between low-, medium- and high-skill workers together with employment
probabilities determine the share of low-, medium- and high-skill workers in each country
in the long-run.
The labour market is represented by a downward sloping labour demand curve
and a wage curve determining the relationship between wage and unemployment. The
slope and position of each curve is skill-specific, implying that also the wage rate and
employment are differentiated between the low-, medium- and high-skill labour. In order
to account for the ethnically split labour market widely observed in the CEE (Ciaian and
Kancs 2016), we follow (Bonacich 1975) and further introduce two types of parallel labour
markets – Roma and non-Roma (see Kancs and Lecca 2018, for details). According to
Bonacich (1975), there may be several reasons for the existence of a split labour market:
(i) discrimination from the mainstream population, (ii) differences and the quality of
education and/or professional qualifications; (iii) differences in worker preferences
(e.g. reservation wage), etc. In our model, the split labour market is country-specific, it
depends on differences in the education quality between Roma and non-Roma. According
to the data that we use to calibrate the model, the larger is the education quality gap
(measured by national test scores of schools with predominantly Roma children and
predominantly non-Roma children), the larger are wage differences for a comparable
work between the two parts of the split labour market. On the labour demand side,
the two types of workers are substitutable (though not perfectly), implying that each
mainstream economy’s firm can hire either Roma workers or non-Roma workers for the
production of goods and services.
4. Scenario construction
4.1. Baseline and setup
In order to undertake a comparative scenario analysis and assess impacts of selected
Roma integration policies in the five CEE countries, first, a baseline scenario is constructed
and simulated. Alternative policy scenarios will be measured against this baseline. In
the context of the European Roma, one of the key assumptions regards the future Roma
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population growth. As detailed in Ciaian and Kancs 2018, Roma is one of the fastest
growing population groups in Europe. In order to account for this fact, we use Eurostat’s
population projections for the general population, which provide ‘what-if ’ scenarios about
the likely future size and structure of population groups, based on assumptions about
fertility, mortality and migration (Eurostat, proj_15npms). We complement Eurostat data
with FRA / European Commission’s 2011 survey data for Roma to derive projections
about the future Roma population growth the rate of which, as detailed in Ciaian and
Kancs 2018, is considerably higher than that of the mainstream population.
Second, alternative integration (counterfactual) scenarios for the marginalised Roma
inclusion are constructed and simulated. In the designed alternative integration policy
scenarios, the education and labour market outcomes of Roma depend on implemented
Roma integration policies. Together with marginalised community inclusion policy
makers and Roma experts in the five studied countries and the European Commission,
we have designed two Roma integration scenarios that could be useful for better under-
standing of the potential magnitude and distribution of economic, budgetary and fiscal
costs and benefits of policy options regarding the Roma integration:16
• Policy Status Quo scenario;
• Universal Basic Income scenario.17
The policy status quo scenario is based on estimates of actual current/future policy
expenditure data, in which already allocated and/or foreseen Roma integration policy
expenditures serve a starting point. Subsequently, improvements in the Roma educational
and labour market outcomes are projected, and finally using the model economic,
budgetary and fiscal effects simulated.
Most of Roma integration policies currently implemented in the EU and simulated
in the policy status quo scenario aim at expanding the supply of social and economic
services (both availability and quality) by improving the education, health and other socio-
economic infrastructure. Whereas supply-side policies may be effective in increasing the
supply of educational services, according to OECD (2017) they do not always lead to the
16Main ideas and key inputs for the Roma integration scenario construction were crystallised at the
European Commission’s workshop on Roma communities in Europe "Taking stock of current science-based
knowledge and what is needed for effective policy development".
17A universal basic income, also referred to as a guaranteed minimum income or income guarantee, is a
cash transfer that everyone within a geographic territory or social community receives on a regular basis
with no conditions on a long-term basis (Thigpen 2016).
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desired uptake and use of these services. The European Court of Auditors has voiced
similar concerns in its special report on EU policy initiatives and financial support for
Roma integration (ECA 2016). Even when costs for these services are kept low or even
free, nevertheless, supply-side policies often fail to satisfactory increase the use of these
services (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2004; Bassett 2008; World Bank 2010).
In order to address deficiencies of supply-side policies, the use of direct cash transfers
is becoming more and more popular in many countries (both developing and developed),
as they can more effectively help to overcome liquidity constraints preventing the use of
supplied public services by poor/marginalised households and are less costly in terms
of their implementation (Tabor 2002; OECD 2017). The idea of direct cash transfers
is not new, it is rooted in the neoclassical economics, according to which individuals
make rational decisions to maximise their own wellbeing by taking into consideration
benefits and costs associated with each decision. When liquidity constrained households
receive cash transfers, their cost-benefit considerations change, which in turn affect
their decision-making calculus. For example, a direct income transfer can reduce the
household opportunity cost of sending children to school, making the benefits of the
schooling & education decision outweigh the costs (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2004; Bassett
2008).
The second scenario – universal basic income – is a hypothetical scenario, in which
we analyse policy impacts under ’what would happen if’ assumptions. In particular,
we assess economic, budgetary and fiscal effects by assuming that the same amount of
Roma policy expenditure as under the policy status quo scenario would be disbursed
in form of direct cash transfers. The analysis investigates the impact of direct cash
transfers but it does not call for such transfers to be targeting only Roma. To the contrary,
they might be more cost-efficient tool for addressing the multiple poverty, deprivation
and discrimination any other group at risk of marginalisation faces, as previous studies
suggest (see section 5.3).
Three types of assumptions need to be made when constructing Roma integration
scenarios: the magnitude and distribution of policy costs (section 4.2); associated im-
provements in the educational attainment (section 4.3); policy-induced improvements in
labour market outcomes (section 4.4); and policy financing sources and methods (section
4.5).
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4.2. Policy costs
We can distinguish between two types of education and training programs and
their related costs in the policy status quo scenario. (i) Roma-specific education and
training programs. Costs of these programs include, for example, teacher salaries
and school buildings for Roma children. (ii) Education programs for children from a
socially disadvantaged environment in general. Costs of these programs include, for
example, equipment in classrooms designated for the instruction of children from socially
disadvantaged environments through the use of special teaching aids, didactic media
and teaching technology.
Roma-specific education and training programs cover policy initiatives that are de-
signed and implemented specifically for Roma. These costs (per child) differ substantially
between the five studied countries. In counterfactual policy scenarios, these costs are
also identified by the educational attainment level, wherever possible. Costs of other
education and training programs, which cannot be associated to children from a par-
ticular educational attainment level as main beneficiaries, are assumed to incur to all
educational attainment levels (primary, secondary and tertiary) proportionally.
Education assistance programs for children from socially disadvantaged environments
include, among others, children from marginalised Roma families. Per child costs of
these programs differ significantly between the five studied countries. However, in our
simulations they are not specific to a particular educational attainment level, as many of
education assistance programs for children from socially disadvantaged environments,
e.g. the early childhood development and pre-school education, are beneficial for children
from all educational attainment levels (primary, secondary and tertiary).
An overview of total Roma integration policy cost estimates in the policy status quo
scenario in each of the five studied countries during 2014-2020 is provided in Table
1. The expenditure estimates reported in Table 1 suggest that, in terms of the total
funding, the marginalised Roma community in Romania (721.82 million Euro) followed
by Hungary (675.70 million Euro) would be the largest beneficiaries of those Roma
integration policies that are analysed in the present study.18 The total funding made
available for Roma integration policy measures that we simulate in counterfactual policy
scenarios is considerably lower in Bulgaria (254.35 million Euro), the Czech Republic
(276.48 million Euro) and Slovakia (272.72 million Euro).
18Note that these selected funds do not correspond to entire policy expenditures on Roma integration in
the five studied EU countries.
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Table 1: Policy costs: yearly amounts made available under selected national, EU and international
measures for the Roma integration in the five study countries during 2014-2020
Bulgaria Czechia Hungary Romania Slovakia
Million Euro
2014 36.05 39.33 98.67 102.81 41.08
2015 36.57 40.14 94.31 106.04 40.83
2016 37.72 38.49 98.65 103.03 37.93
2017 35.48 39.76 98.05 100.86 39.38
2018 36.68 39.05 93.57 98.54 39.38
2019 35.63 39.66 95.25 106.43 37.42
2020 36.23 40.06 97.21 104.11 36.69
Total 254.35 276.48 675.70 721.82 272.72
Percent of GDP
2014 0.090 0.026 0.101 0.073 0.057
2015 0.092 0.027 0.096 0.075 0.057
2016 0.095 0.026 0.101 0.073 0.053
2017 0.089 0.027 0.100 0.071 0.055
2018 0.092 0.026 0.096 0.070 0.055
2019 0.089 0.027 0.097 0.075 0.052
2020 0.091 0.027 0.099 0.074 0.051
Average 0.091 0.026 0.099 0.073 0.054
Source: Authors’ estimates based on national Roma integration authorities; European Commission (2017) and Roma Education
Fund (2017).
For the sake of comparability between the two policy scenarios, in the universal basic
income scenario we assume that the same total amounts of the Roma integration funding
are made available to Roma in each of the five studied countries as under the policy status
quo scenario (Table 1). The key difference between the two policy scenarios is that in the
universal basic income scenario these funds are disbursed directly to marginalised Roma
households. Specifically, we assume that direct cash transfers are disbursed without
coupling them to any spending condition.19 Being administratively simple, low-cost and
fundamentally market neutral, unconditional cash transfers do not introduce any market
19In sensitivity analyses we also explore a potential value added of conditional cash transfers. For that
purpose, we construct an additional sub-scenario where cash transfers to Roma households are conditioned
on the children school attendance. In order to account for costs associated with verifying and imposing
the compliance with transfer conditionalities, we follow Caldes et al. (2006) and assume that policy
implementation and verification costs burn 24 percent of total policy expenditures in the conditional cash
transfer scenario.
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Figure 6: Education costs: public versus private. Source: Based on Tsang (1988).
distortions (Standing 2007).
As shown in Figure 6, education costs consist of two parts: private and public (Tsang
1988; Mehrotra et al. 1996). Both types of education costs are captured explicitly in the
underlying model. Whereas education demand-side policies attempt to reduce mainly
private education costs (see right panel of Figure 6), education supply-side policies are
related mainly to public education costs (see left panel of Figure 6).
4.3. Policy impact on education
We can distinguish between policy-induced improvements in educational outcomes
and improvements in labour market outcomes. As regards educational outcomes, their
impact depends on policy implementation details (parameter α in equation (1) and
variable b in equation (2)) and also on a number of household-specific factors, which in
the underlying model are captured through decision variables (variable ze in equation
(2)). Two important elasticities governing the policy impact on the Roma education are
the income elasticity of demand for education and the price elasticity of demand for
education.
According to the previous literature (Dur and Teulings 2003), an important determi-
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nant of the education policy impact is the price elasticity of demand for education. Among
others, the elasticity of demand for education with respect to the schooling cost deter-
mines the effectiveness of supply-side education policies in increasing the stock of the
human capital through education. Households choose their demand for education such
that the marginal return to education is equal to its cost. A supply-side education policy
reduces the education cost and hence also the marginal return. The larger is the elasticity
of demand for schooling with respect to its cost, the lower is the amount of a policy
intervention that is required for a given increase in the mean level of the human capital,
and hence the smaller is the adverse effect on the income distribution. The sensitivity of
demand for education to supply-side education policies is particularly important, when
the innate ability of individuals and the education demand are complementary. The
baseline value of this elasticity is adopted from Campbell and Siegel (1967) and is set to
-0.44. In sensitivity analyses we explore the impact in 5% steps of up to 50% lower/higher
elasticities (see section 5.2).
As regards the income elasticity of demand for education, generally, the previous literature
suggests positive relationship, implying that an increase in the household income results
in higher demand for education (Becker 1990). However, the relationship between the
education demand and household income is complex and non-linear, as the demand for
education depends among others on household preferences and budget constraints faced
by (marginalised) households, both in turn being influenced by the household income.
For example, given the labour-supply potential of children in poor households, higher
household income decreases (lower income increases) – as in the universal basic income
scenario – the opportunity cost of sending children to school. Overall, an increase in the
household income is expected to positively influence schooling decisions, particularly of
poor households. Also the baseline value of this elasticity is adopted from Campbell and
Siegel (1967) and is set to 1.20. In sensitivity analyses we explore the impact in 5% steps
of up to 50% lower/higher elasticities (see section 5.2).
In line with the previous literature (Tsang 1988), we assume that Roma policies
implemented through the policy status quo scenario function primarily through lowering
costs, by covering e.g. personnel costs such as teachers and administrative staff, non-
personnel costs such as textbooks, utilities and the school maintenance, as well as capital
costs such as buildings, land, equipment and furniture and hence increasing the supply
of educational services (see the right panel of Figure 6 as captured by parameter α in
equation (1) and variable b in equation (2)). Building new schools/classes in a close
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proximity to Roma communities, reduces the cost of accessing educational services. This
reduction however risks contributing to the segregation of Roma children in education
diluting the potential benefits from reduced costs through a sub-standard quality of
education services provided and underdeveloped social skills necessary for a sustainable
integration of children in the mainstream society after completing education. Similarly,
training teachers to new integrated education methods increases the accessibility of
education for Roma children (Kertesi and Kezdi 2011). Hence, educational outcomes
in the policy status quo scenario will depend primarily on the price elasticity of the
household demand for education as well as on the implementation of policy measures
to offset the potential negative implications of focused interventions (e.g. through an
increased segregation).
In line with the previous evidence (Aizer et al. 2016; Nikiforos et al. 2017; Marinescu
2017), we further assume that Roma policies implemented through the universal basic
income scenario function primarily through increasing the household income and hence
provide additional financial resources to households for lowering e.g. opportunity costs
of a child work in household, covering tuition and other school fees, uniforms, books and
transportation costs (see the left panel of Figure 6 as captured by variable ze in equation
(2)) resulting in higher demand for education. Increasing a household income that is
not related to household economic activities may also optimise consumption/investment
decisions, resulting in more efficient allocation of household resources, including educa-
tion. Hence, educational outcomes in the universal basic income scenario will depend
primarily on the income elasticity of the household demand for education. Finally, the
universal basic income scenario has important empowerment implications reinforcing the
agency of marginalised populations that are difficult to factor in the model but should be
kept in mind when interpreting simulation results.
Differences in the channels of adjustment (reducing public versus private education
costs) and in values between the income elasticity and price elasticity of demand for
education will result in different educational outcomes between the policy status quo and
universal basic income scenarios. In line with Roma policy expenditure data discussed
in the previous section, we assume that Roma education-related policy expenditures
improve children educational attainment rates in all three levels (primary, secondary
and tertiary). Further, we also assume that the quality of education improves, which
will reduce the Roma / non-Roma labour market segregation. Note that there will be
important differences in educational outcomes (in terms of policy-induced improvements
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in the education quality and quantity) between the two simulated policy scenarios.
4.4. Labour market outcomes
As regards policy-induced improvements in labour market outcomes, in line with the
empirical evidence (e.g. O’Higgins and Ivanov 2006; O’Higgins 2012), in both scenarios
higher educational attainment rates and higher education quality of Roma children result
in better labour market outcomes of Roma – employment and earnings – increase. In
order to link policy expenditures on the Roma education to labour market outcomes (i.e.
the employment rate and wage rate) in both the policy status quo and universal basic income
scenarios, we base our estimates on European Commission’s 2017 data, according to
which there are substantial differences in unemployment rates between those Roma who
have completed a tertiary education, secondary, primary or have less than the primary
education. On average, in the five studied countries, respective unemployment rates are
29%, 38%, 55% and 81%. These figures are comparable to those reported in O’Higgins
and Ivanov (2006) for Roma in nine CEE countries. Note that in both scenarios we assume
the same relationship between policy-induced improvements in educational outcomes
and labour market outcomes. Hence, an equivalent increase in the educational attainment
in the policy status quo and universal basic income scenarios will result in an equal increase
in the employment probability and wage rate.20
Key assumptions linking policy-induced improvements in educational attainment
rates and higher education quality and labour market outcomes of Roma – employment
and earnings – are summarised in Table 2. As shown in the Table, one extra year of
schooling has higher impact on the Roma unemployment than earnings. The opposite is
true for the increase in test scores by one standard deviation. For comparison, in Table
2 we have also provided the estimated impact of marginal labour market effects of one
extra year of schooling and one standard deviation increase in test scores on employment
and earnings for the USA, Canada, UK and OECD countries.
4.5. Policy financing methods and sources
In the policy status quo scenario, we simulate impacts of selected national government,
EU and internationally funded programmes of the Roma inclusion. Nationally funded
Roma integration programs simulated in the present study include both Roma-specific
20We are aware of the significant role of the quality of education (the breadth and depth of knowledge
acquired). We assume however that quality remains the same under both scenarios.
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Table 2: Scenario construction: Marginal labour market effects
Education quantity channel Education quality channel
Effect on: One extra year of schooling One s.d. higher test scores
Unemployment
Policy status quo -13.3% -2.5%
Universal basic income -13.3% -2.5%
Previous studies
USA -40.6%
Canada -21.0%
UK -18.2%
OECD -1.4%
Earnings
Policy status quo 6.1% +3.3%
Universal basic income 6.1% +3.3%
Previous studies
USA +15.7%
Canada +13.8%
UK +7.3%
OECD +2.0%
Source: Authors’ estimates based on European Commission (2017): Roma integration indicators scoreboard (2011-2016), SWD(2017)
286 final. Notes: s.d. denotes standard deviation, estimates for the USA, Canada and UK based on Oreopoulos (2007), estimates for
OECD countries based on Hanushek and Woessmann (2007).
programs as well as general programs for marginalised society groups from which Roma
benefit, e.g. programs for children from a socially disadvantaged environment. As for
EU funds, we have selected the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), which
provide allocations to Roma under the investment priority ‘Integration of marginalised
communities such as the Roma’ for the 2014-2020 programming period. As for the
international funding of the Roma integration, we have chosen programmes managed by
the Rome Education Fund, which include allocations to the Roma education under the
heading ’Programs and Grants’.
Table 3 provides an overview of the total funding made available under national,
EU and international financing tools for the Roma integration simulated in the present
study during 2014-2020, by the source of funding. The expenditure estimates reported
in Table 3 suggest that, from those Roma integration funds considered in the present
study, the ESIF make available the largest funding (1284.00 million Euro), followed by
national Roma integration programmes (881.94 million Euro) and the Roma Education
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Table 3: Total amounts made available under selected national, EU and international measures for the
Roma integration during 2014-2020 by the source of funding, million Euro
Bulgaria Czechia Hungary Romania Slovakia Average
National Funding 104.84 74.03 197.19 334.36 171.52 176.39
ESIF 143.00 200.00 470.00 372.00 99.00 256.80
Roma Education Fund 6.52 2.45 8.51 15.46 2.20 7.03
Total 254.35 276.48 675.70 721.82 272.72 440.21
Source: Authors’ estimates based on national Roma integration authorities; European Commission (2017) and Roma Education
Fund (2017). Notes: The national funding includes selected Roma-targeted measures and general programmes for marginalised
society groups; the ESIF includes European Structural and Investment Funds investment priority 9(ii) ’Integration of marginalised
communities such as the Roma’; the Roma Education Fund includes all investment in the Roma education listed under ’Total
Programs and Grants’.
Fund (35.13 million Euro).21
For the sake of comparability between the two policy scenarios, in the universal basic
income scenario we assume not only the same total amounts in each country but also the
same funding sources as under the policy status quo scenario.
Important for both scenarios is that in the general equilibrium framework adopted in
the present study all expenditures have to be covered through an additional government
revenue (or an equivalent reduction in the existing government expenditure), either at the
national, EU or international level. Note, however, that there are important differences
between the three financing sources of Roma integration programs, and these differences
are fully accounted for in our model. Whereas national Roma integration policies are
entirely financed from respective Member State budgets, EU funds are financed by all EU
taxpayers. This implies that EU-level Roma integration programs are partially financed by
other EU Member States, as the distribution of net contributing and receiving payments
across EU Member States according to the EU budgetary data (European Commission
2017) is fully captured in the model. As regards internationally funded Roma inclusion
programs, such as the Roma Education Fund, their financing is not modelled explicitly,
21Note that for those Roma integration policies for which there is available information also about
planned expenditures in future we use these data. For example, the ESIF provide allocations to EU
Member States under the investment priority ‘Integration of marginalised communities such as the Roma’
for the entire 2014-2020(+3) programming period. For other programs, for which no expenditure data
about future Roma integration programs are available year-by-year for 2014-2020, e.g. national Roma
integration programmes and the Roma Education Fund, we use average expenditures from the last three
years (2014-2016) also for the remaining period (2017-2020).
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they are considered as pure financial transfers from the rest of the world.
5. Simulation results
5.1. Main results
Aggregated simulation results are reported in Figure 7, where we plot the percentage
deviation in the GDP from baseline values for the two alternative Roma integration
scenarios (policy status quo and universal basic income) for the five studied countries
(Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia) for the 2014-2040 pe-
riod.22 Whereas the solid and dashed lines denote GDP impacts of the policy status quo
and universal basic income scenarios, respectively, bars represent policy costs as a share
of the GDP. Note that bars correspond to figures reported in Tables 1 and 3. For the sake
of comparability, both policy costs and impacts are plotted on the same scale – as percent
of the GDP – and hence are directly comparable.
Generally, our simulation results suggest that in the first years of the policy implemen-
tation policy costs (bars in Figure 7) would be higher than the GDP growth generated
through Roma integration in labour markets. Second, in the medium- to long-run both
types of Roma integration policies would have positive and significant impact on the GDP
(solid and dashed lines in Figure 7) (in addition to likely positive humanitarian and other
non-economic effects, which are not considered here). However, there are remarkable
differences in terms of the economic impact between the five studied countries, the two
Roma integration scenarios and the time period considered.
From the very first year of the integration policy implementation, the positive impact
on the GDP increases continuously in all five studied countries. The policy-induced GDP
growth reaches its peak in 7-10 years, after which is starts to decline. It is not surprising
to observe a declining impact on the GDP, as in our simulations the Roma policy funding
stops after 2020(+3). Depending on the policy scenario and country, the policy-induced
long-run growth path stabilises at around 0.01 % to 0.10 % above the baseline growth
(see Figure 7). While all five countries share a similar short-run dynamics, differences
in the GDP impact between countries become more visible when, because of the Roma
integration, the labour force and hence economies expand.
The result that the medium-term impact on the GDP is larger than the long-run
effect is due to the fact that the simulated Roma integration policy measures imply a
22We are aware also of the positive non-monetary implications of integration policies. We assume
however that these are correlated with the GDP impact that can be quantified.
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Figure 7: The simulated impact on the GDP and policy costs in percent of the GDP in the five studied
countries under the Policy Status Quo and Universal Basic Income scenarios. Source: Authors’ simulations.
Notes: Y axis: percent of the GDP; X axis: years. See section 5.2 for lower/upper bounds.
combination of one short-run demand-side shock and one long-run supply-side shock. In
the short- to medium-run, on the demand side there is an increase in current government
expenditures related to policy costs of the Roma integration into the labour market and
the corresponding reduction in the disposable household income (due to lower transfers
/ higher taxes). The latter effect arises, because we account for the fact that all integration
policy costs are fully financed by EU Member States.23 On the supply-side the integration
of Roma into labour markets increases the labour supply in EU Member States in the
medium- to long-run. As detailed in section 4, the increase in the labour force is Member
23We believe that by assuming that integration policy costs could be financed through a government
borrowing could bias the interpretation of simulation results. For example, more integration policy
expenditures could be always better than less, if associated policy costs were not borne by economic agents
through appropriate financing mechanisms. Therefore, we assume that all Roma integration policies are
fully financed by households in the form of a reduction in government transfers to the household income
or, equivalently, an increase in income taxes.
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State-, skill- and year-specific, and differs between the two Roma integration policy
scenarios. Peak in the policy-induced GDP growth is reached after 7-10 years, when the
demand-side shock is still present and in addition also the supply-side shock already
materialises.
The integration policy-induced growth rate of the GDP is comparably high in all five
studied countries in the short-run. It is a remarkable result in light of the negligible share
of the Roma population in the total labour force (see first years in Figure 7). According to
our simulation results, in the short-run, the strongest positive GDP effect can be expected
in Romania, followed by the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. The lowest short-run GDP
growth rate can be expected in Hungary. In the medium-run, as more educated and
trained Roma workers enter the labour market, all five economies continue to expand,
though the marginal effect is decreasing.
After a transitionary dynamics, GDP growth rates reach a new steady state above the
baseline growth path of the GDP. In terms of the GDP level, under the universal basic
income scenario expected policy-induced deviations above the base line are significantly
larger in the long-run than in the short-run, which is consistent for all five studied
countries. This however, is not true under the policy status quo scenario, implying that
policy demand-side effects are stronger than policy supply-side effects in the medium- to
long-run.
Comparing GDP impacts between the two Roma integration scenarios, we can notice
that in the short-run the policy status quo scenario generates more economic activities,
resulting in higher GDP effects compared to the universal basic income scenario (see
Figure 7). In the medium- to long-run (starting from year 5), however, the policy-induced
GDP growth generated under the universal basic income scenario becomes larger than
under the policy status quo scenario. It is also interesting to notice that in all five studied
countries the GDP reaches the highest impact earlier under the policy status quo scenario
than under the universal basic income scenario (2020-2021 and 2023-2024, respectively).
This result is in line with previous studies on assessing impacts of the universal basic
income, which find that conditioning a public policy support to marginalised society
groups can sooner produce higher impact in terms of GDP, income and employment
(Akee et al. 2010; Butcher 2017; Colombino 2015; Hum and Simpson 1993; Kela 2016;
Nikiforos et al. 2017; Pareliussen et al. 2018). In the medium- to long-run, however, the
positive effect remains below that of universal basic income policies.
Turning to country-specific results, we notice that Hungary, followed by Bulgaria, has
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Table 4: Annual and cumulative impact on the GDP, Million Euro
Bulgaria Czechia Hungary Romania Slovakia EU-5
Annual (long-run)
Policy status quo 16.47 18.04 43.94 47.00 17.24 142.69
Universal basic income 38.53 42.19 102.79 109.93 40.32 333.75
Cumulative, net
Policy status quo 212.47 234.63 568.27 610.04 217.11 1842.52
Universal basic income 661.69 726.67 1766.94 1892.02 686.89 5734.21
Cumulative, discounted
Policy status quo 71.53 80.10 191.95 207.43 69.98 620.99
Universal basic income 295.09 324.98 788.50 845.44 303.75 2557.75
Source: Authors’ simulations. Notes: All figures are in Million Euro in 2040. In all computations a 4% discount rate is applied.
the highest potential to boost the GDP through the Roma integration under the universal
basic income scenario. The long-run GDP deviation above the baseline scenario can be
expected at +0.10 percent for Hungary and +0.09 percent for Bulgaria under the universal
basic income scenario (see Figure 7). These results are in line with our expectations,
considering that the education gap between Roma and non-Roma in Hungary and
Bulgaria is particularly large, and the Roma share in these countries in (8% and 10%,
respectively) is among the highest in the EU. Note, however, these two countries would
have to allocate a significant funding to reap such benefits from the Roma inclusion. In
contrast, the lowest long-run GDP effect can be expected in the Czech Republic (+0.03%),
followed by Slovakia (+0.06%) under the full integration scenario (see Figure 7). Also
these results are not surprising, when considering the lower amounts of funding allocated
for Roma inclusion programs and the projected share of Roma in the total population in
these countries. A similar cross-country pattern can be observed also for the policy status
quo scenario, though, all five countries can expect a comparably lower GDP growth effect
under the policy status quo scenario.
Whereas Figure 7 reported year-by-year GDP results as percentage deviations above
baseline, Table 4 provides an overview of long-run GDP results expressed in million
Euro. Also these results confirm that the long-run GDP impact would be positive under
both types of integration policies in all five studied countries. Table 4 suggests that
in nominal terms (million Euro) Romania followed by Hungary would benefit most
from the simulated Roma integration policies. Bulgaria, in contrast to Figure 7, would
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benefit the least, as in these computations the size of economies plays a role as well.
According to Table 4, the positive GDP effects generated under the universal basic income
scenario are considerably larger than under the policy status quo scenario (as already
seen in Figure 7). Aggregated for the five studied countries, annually, the universal basic
income scenario would generate more that two times higher GDP impact than the policy
status quo scenario: 142.69 and 333.75 million Euro, respectively (last column in Table 4).
Cumulatively, the difference in the discounted net GDP effect is even larger: by 2040 the
universal basic income scenario would have generated almost 2 billion more GDP than
the policy status quo scenario (2557.75 and 620.99 million Euro, respectively).
Finally, the general equilibrium nature of the model allows us to identify policy
leakages to non-targeted groups/expenditures of Roma integration policies. According to
our simulation results, the main source of a potential policy leakage in the policy status
quo scenario is the inter-household competition for additional / less costly education
services stemming from non-Roma households. Between 16.9% and 47.1% of Roma
integration policy expenditures end up in non-Roma households in the five study
countries. In the universal basic income scenario, the main source of a potential policy
leakage is the intra-household competition for additional financial resources from other
(non-education) expenditures of Roma households. Between 24.3% and 55.8% of Roma
integration policy expenditures result in non-education expenditures of Roma households.
These two sources of potential policy leakages need to be kept in mind when designing
and implementing Roma integration policies in the EU.
As next, we investigate whether and to what extent the costs associated with Roma
integration policies would be offset by positive economic, budgetary and fiscal benefits
generated from the increase in workforce in the long-run. To identify relative policy
benefits, we compute the net present value (NPV) associated with each integration
scenario until 2040, as it should provide an idea of the time in which the economy is
able to fully absorb the exogenous demand shock. The NPV is calculated as a difference
between the discounted present value of the policy-induced GDP growth above baseline
values and the discounted present value of government expenditures. Following the EU
Better regulation guidelines,24 the discount rate applied in these calculations is equal
to 0.04.25 NPV results for the five studied countries for both scenarios are reported in
Figure 8.
24https://ec.europa.eu/info/better-regulation-guidelines-and-toolbox_en
25In order to assess differences in the simulated policy impact under alternative discount rates, we
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Figure 8: Net present value, Million Euro. Source: Authors’ simulations. Notes: In all computations a
4% discount rate is applied. Shaded areas around main NPV results represent 3% and 5% discount rates,
respectively.
Results from NPV computations suggest that the NPV is negative in initial years but
then eventually becomes positive in the medium- to long-run (Figure 8). More important
is fact that the NPV becomes positive under both Roma integration scenarios. Depending
on the scenario and country of analysis, the full repayment of the integration policy
investment (positive net present value) would be achieved after 7 to 9 years. Note that
the NPV gives us the size of the (discounted) financial multiplier effect in each period.
Hence, even if the NPV is negative in the short- to medium-run, not necessarily the
overall impact on the economy is negative. These results could simply imply that the
financial multiplier effect is lower than one. Hence, our results suggest that, in order
to be able to gain from the full potential of the Roma integration in EU labour markets,
perform sensitivity analyses with 0.03 and 0.05 discount rates.
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taxpayers should be prepared to accept certain costs in the short-run. Moreover, even
these short-run disadvantages are associated with positive growth effects in all five
studied countries (Figure 7).
Comparing the two alternative integration policy scenarios, we notice that in the
short-run the policy status quo scenario is associated with higher NPV. In the medium- to
long-run however, the generated benefits in terms of an additional GDP growth are higher
under the universal basic income scenario. In order to assess robustness of presented
simulation results with respect to alternative discount rate assumptions, we perform
NPV computations with 1 percentage point lower/higher discount rates, the results of
which are reported as shaded areas around main NPV results (solid line for the policy
status quo scenario and dashed line for the universal basic income scenario) in Figure 8.
These results suggest that there are no qualitative changes in the simulated NPV when
applying different (+/- 1 percentage point) discount rates in a reasonable range.
5.2. Sensitivity analysis and robustness checks
In order to ensure that our simulation results are robust with respect to reasonable
changes in underlying parameter values and assumptions, we undertake a global sen-
sitivity analysis of the parameterised model and the two Roma integration scenarios,
selected results of which are presented in Figure 7. Given that the objective of the present
study is to simulate, assess and compare impacts of alternative Roma integration policies,
those assumptions that govern the scenario construction are particularly critical for the
robustness of our simulation results. Therefore, all these assumptions are scrutinised
extensively in sensitivity and uncertainty analyses.
Because of its prominent role, we report and discuss the results of the sensitivity
analysis obtained under alternative assumptions of the integration policy elasticities
(the income elasticity of demand for education and the price elasticity of demand
for education, see section 4.3), as these assumptions have been identified among key
determinants driving simulation results. In this exercise, we decrease and increase default
policy elasticities by 5% to 50% (see Table 5), respectively, and compare model results with
those under our default assumptions. The main purpose of this exercise is to evaluate
the extent to which marginal changes in underlying model assumptions would alter the
direction and magnitude of the projected policy impacts reported in preceding sections.
The sensitivity analysis results for these two key parameters (the income elasticity of
demand for education and the price elasticity of demand for education) are reported as
shaded areas in Figure 7, which report the possible outcome range (lower/upper bounds)
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Table 5: Values of income and price elasticities of demand for education used in the sensitivity analysis
Elasticities of demand for education
Income elasticity Price elasticity
Lower value 0.60 -0.66
Central value 1.20 -0.44
Upper value 1.80 -0.22
Source: Education elasticity values based on Campbell and Siegel (1967).
identified in these simulations. For each scenario, we show a case where policy elasticities
are reduced (lower), augmented (upper) and kept at their default (central) value.
Sensitivity analysis results reported in Figure 7 suggest that in both Roma integration
scenarios the short-run impact of altering policy elasticities in a reasonable range does
not generate qualitatively different and statistically significant deviations in simulation
results. However, as the labour force expands and economies grow due to the integration
of Roma workers into labour markets, the impact of higher/lower policy elasticities
realises more prominently. In line with our expectations, by lowering policy elasticities,
the simulated GDP impact is lower; whereas by increasing policy elasticities, the GDP
impact becomes larger. We do not observe, however, qualitative changes in simulation
results under alternative policy efficiency assumptions.
In addition to the above presented sensitivity analysis results, we have also performed
further sensitivity analyses with respect to the Roma population growth in the five
studied countries, key model assumptions and parameter values. Also these sensitivity
analysis results suggest that the underlying simulation model is robust with respect to
qualitatively reasonable changes in baseline assumptions, key model assumptions and
values of behavioural parameters. Hence, we may conclude that the results presented in
this study are robust and therefore can be made available for an evidence-based policy
support.
5.3. Comparison with previous studies
The results reported in previous two sections that unconditional income transfers
to poor and marginalised households (as simulated under the universal basic income
scenario) have positive and a statistically significant impact on children education, adult
earnings and employment and the GDP in the medium- to long-run, are supported by the
previous literature. Our main findings could be summarised by the words of Marinescu
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(2018):
"Providing cash directly to individuals has often been met with criticism, suspicion,
and fear: the thinking goes that people who need financial assistance are not to be
trusted, as their financial position reflects a moral failing rather than a societal one.
These objections to cash transfer programs are rooted more in myth than empirical
evidence."
Hum and Simpson (1993) review research from five universal basic income experi-
ments in Canada and the United States. In order to make results for different uncon-
ditional income transfer programs comparable, the authors account for differences in
the designs of policy experiments. The primary focus of Hum and Simpson (1993) is
the work-incentive issue, both nonstructural estimates of the experimental effects and
elasticity estimates of structural labour-supply functions, though the authors also provide
initial estimates of nonstructural and structural models for the Canadian universal basic
income experiments. Hum and Simpson (1993) find only few adverse effects from the
universal basic income. More importantly, those adverse effects found, such as the work
response, were smaller than suggested by the economic theory.
Kertesi and Kézdi (2006) estimate the expected long-term budgetary benefits from
investing into the Roma education in Hungary. The authors estimate the net benefit of
an extra investment (on top of the existing pre-school and primary school financing)
that enables a young Roma to successfully complete secondary school. The results
of Kertesi and Kézdi (2006) indicate that an investment that makes one young Roma
successfully complete secondary school would yield significant direct long-term benefits
to the national budget. According to benchmark estimates discounted to age 4, the net
present value of future benefits is about EUR 70 000 relative to the value the government
would collect on the representative Roma person in case if she had not continued her
studies after the primary school.
Akee et al. (2010) study the role of an exogenous increase in the household income due
to government transfers that are unrelated to household characteristics on children’s long-
run outcomes. The authors look at households in which incomes have been increased
exogenously and permanently through a governmental transfer program without regard
to the parental human capital, ability or other household characteristics. Akee et al.
(2010) find that children in treated households have higher levels of education in their
young adulthood and lower incidence of criminality; though effects differ by the initial
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household poverty status. On average, an unconditional income support of USD 4 000
per year for the poorest households increases the educational attainment by one year at
age 21.
Also Colombino (2015) finds that, if correctly designed and implemented, a guaranteed
unconditional basic income might be an important policy innovation for redistributing
the gains from automation and globalisation, building a buffer against shocks and
systemic risks, and generating positive labour supply incentives among poor people.
Colombino (2015) also notes that while an unconditional basic income policy is simple
and transparent with low administration costs, financing it might require higher taxes
(which however is the case of any public policy).
Aizer et al. (2016) estimate the long-run impact of cash transfers to poor families on
children’s educational attainment, nutritional status longevity and income in adulthood.
To do so, the authors have collected individual-level administrative records of applicants
to the Mothers’ Pension program—the first government-sponsored welfare program
in the US (1911-1935) —and matched them to census, WWII and death records. The
results of Aizer et al. (2016) suggest that male children of accepted applicants lived one
year longer than those of rejected mothers. Male children of accepted mothers received
one-third more years of schooling, were less likely to be underweight, and had higher
income in adulthood than children of rejected mothers.
Butcher (2017) surveys the empirical literature on the long-run impact on children
of unconditional cash transfers, food and nutrition programs, health care and health
insurance and housing initiatives. Butcher (2017) finds a mounting and dramatic evidence
that transfers to low-income families early in children’s lives greatly manifest later in
their lives. These findings lead to conclude that children’s environment in the prenatal,
neonatal, and early childhood periods can profoundly affect the capacities that children
develop. According to Butcher (2017), these capacities persist into adulthood, affecting
earnings, health, and other life outcomes.
Nikiforos et al. (2017) examine three versions of unconditional cash transfers: USD 1
000 a month to all adults, USD 500 a month to all adults, and a USD 250 a month child
allowance. For each of the three versions, the authors assess the macroeconomic effects
of these transfers using two different financing plans - increasing the federal debt, or
fully funding the increased spending with increased taxes on households. Nikiforos et al.
(2017) find that the economy can not only withstand large increases in federal spending,
but could also grow thanks to the stimulative effects of cash transfers on the economy.
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Under the smallest spending scenario, USD 250 per month for each child, the GDP is
0.79% larger than under the baseline forecast after eight years. The largest cash program
– USD 1 000 for all adults annually – expands the economy by 12.56% over the baseline
after eight years. These macroeconomic model-based results are directly comparable to
our results.
Kela (2018) is currently evaluating the guaranteed basic income experiment in Finland.
During the basic income experiment that runs from 2017 to 2018 (2019), a total of 2 000
unemployed persons between 25 and 58 years of age receive a monthly payment of EUR
560, unconditionally and without means testing. The policy evaluation is being done
by comparing the treated group of 2 000 persons with a control group of about 173 000.
The control group is made up of persons included in the target population who were
not selected for the study. The preliminary evidence suggests that there are positive
and significant differences in employment rates between those receiving and those not
receiving a guaranteed basic income.
Pareliussen et al. (2018) at the OECD compare the currently implemented Finland’s
benefit system with two benefit reform scenarios: a uniform benefit for all (“basic income”)
and a universal tapering rule (“universal credit”). The policy scenarios are modelled with
the OECD TaxBen model and the TUJA micro-simulation model. Pareliussen et al. (2018)
find that replacing current benefits with a universal basic income would improve work
incentives for many poor households, though may be also associated with a redistribution
of income. Merging working-age benefits with similar aims and coordinating their
tapering against earnings would on the other hand consistently improve work incentives
and transparency, while preserving or improving social protection.
Jones and Marinescu (2018) study the effects of universal and permanent cash trans-
fers on the labour market. Using data from the Population Survey and a synthetic control
method, the authors show that the universal basic income had no adverse effect on em-
ployment, and increased part-time work by 1.8 percentage points (17 percent). Although
the economic theory suggests that individual cash transfers may decrease the household
labour supply, Jones and Marinescu (2018) interpret their results as evidence that general
equilibrium effects of widespread and permanent transfers tend to offset this effect, at
least on the extensive margin. Consistent with their results, Jones and Marinescu (2018)
provide suggestive evidence that tradeable sectors experience employment reductions,
while non-tradable sectors do not.
Marinescu (2018) explore how unconditional cash transfers affect the behaviour of
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recipients in three major natural experiments in the USA. While the amounts dispersed
and time periods were distinct in each policy experiment, each of them have provided
money without setting conditions and without a means test. As regards education,
Marinescu (2018) found that the school attendance, grades, and test scores for the children
of negative income tax recipients were typically higher than the control population,
especially for younger and poorer children. An additional USD 4 000 per year for the
poorest households in the casino dividend program increased educational attainment by
one year. Further, the programs analysed suggest either no effect on the labour market
supply or a slight reduction in work. Results, however, do not suggest that an average
worker will drop out of the labour force when provided with an unconditional cash
transfer, even when the transfer is large.
6. Conclusions
The present study undertakes a comparative analysis of long-term economic, bud-
getary and fiscal costs and benefits of alternative Roma integration policies in the areas of
education and employment in five EU Member States with the largest share of the Roma
population – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. We employ
a general equilibrium approach that allows us to assess not only the direct impact of
selected Roma integration policies but also to capture all induced feedback effects.
Our simulation results suggest that, although the Roma integration (e.g. by providing
education assistance services and a targeted professional training) would be costly for
the public budget, in the medium- to long-run, economic, budgetary and fiscal benefits
may significantly outweigh the short- to medium-run Roma integration costs. Second,
the policy status quo scenario creates higher GDP growth in the short-run, whereas the
universal basic income scenario is more beneficial in the medium- to long-run. These
findings do not provide any empirical evidence for the criticism, suspicion and fear
associated with policies that provide cash directly to individuals. Depending on the
integration policy scenario and the analysed country, the annual long-run GDP effect
would be from +16.47 Million Euro to +109.93 Million Euro above the baseline GDP,
and the full repayment of the integration policy investment (positive net present value)
would be achieved after 7 to 9 years. Finally, our results suggest that there would be no
displacement effects to mainstream worker employment/wages. In contrast, by filling
vacancies, the Roma workers included in the labour market would generate an additional
economic activity, which in turn would contribute to the growth of the GDP, exports,
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public tax revenue, etc.
Our results have important policy messages. First, these findings suggest that invest-
ing into integration policies that facilitate the inclusion of Roma into the school education
and labour markets is important not only for ethical, humanitarian and fundamental
rights reasons, but may be beneficial also for economic, budgetary and fiscal reasons in
the medium- to long-run. Second, we show that integrated Roma workers can play an
important role in filling vacancies with specific skill requirements, addressing Europe’s
alarming demographic challenges, improving the ratio of economically active to those
who are inactive – a ratio that is decreasing in many Member States – and boost jobs and
growth in the EU. In terms of the GDP, employment and earnings, the universal basic
income scenario clearly outperforms currently implemented Roma integration policies,
particularly in the medium- to long-run.
Turning to limitations of our study, we recognise that in the presented analysis we
have focused solely on socio-economic impacts (both costs and benefits) of the Roma
integration. In reality, however, there are many more aspects, such as humanitarian,
fairness, equality and fundamental rights, etc., which all need to be taken into account by
policy makers, when designing Roma integration policies. Analysing all these aspects
in an integrated framework comprises a promising though also challenging avenue
for the future research. Second, our simulation results depend on a large number
of assumptions that yield uncertainties both in the scenario construction and in the
underlying simulation model. While, we have been using the best data available to date,
have attempted to be as transparent as possible about all key assumptions underlying
our simulations and have been running extensive sensitivity and uncertainty analysis to
test the simulation result sensitivity with respect to them, the robustness of presented
findings would benefit significantly from complementary micro-econometric analysis
(e.g. econometric estimation of the household demand for education), which invites
for a follow-up research on Roma integration policies in future. Third, in the present
study we have focused on the main channels of household adjustment to policies shocks.
A promising area for the future research would be, for example, to endogenise the
number of children per household (by household type), and consequently also the cost
of education.
Finally, the analysis conducted on the specific group (Roma) might be expanded to
other groups vulnerable to discrimination and social exclusion. Although, we intuitively
expect unconditional cash transfers under a basic minimum income schemes to yield
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similar results for other vulnerable groups, additional research is required to generate a
sound evidence in this regard.
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A.1 Model description
The general equilibrium model adopted in the present study follows the approach
of Ciaian and Kancs (2016) and Kancs and Lecca (2018). The employed model offers
a flexible modelling framework containing many options that can be selected from,
depending on the policy question.1 The model version that we employ in the present
study and describe below is tailored for the analysis of socio-economic consequences of
integration policies, while keeping the model as tractable as possible by focussing on the
main drivers and impacts of integration, without unnecessary complicating the model
that would make results difficult to interpret. To better identify and understand the main
drivers and determinants of the outcomes generated by the model, a skeletal version
of the model representing the main mechanics and adjustment channels are presented
below. In their simplest form, the key optimising behaviour and equilibrium conditions
can be summarised as follows.
A.1.1 Consumption
In each country (indexed by subscript r), the representative household has a nested
utility structure. In each time period,2 consumers in country r receive utility from
consumption, Cr.3 The household problem consists of the maximisation of a nested
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function by choosing optimal levels of
consumption subject to a budget constraint. The first order condition of this optimisation
problem implies that the aggregate consumption level, Xd, is increasing in the disposable
income, Yd, (net of savings, Sd, the rate of which, sd, is a fixed share of income) but
decreasing in the general price level of consumption goods:
Xd =
(1− sd)Yd
Pd
(1)
where Xd is the total consumer demand in country d, Yd is the household income in
country d and Pd is the general price index for consumption goods in country d.
The representative household is endowed with different types of labour and capital,
the services of which are leased to firms. The household income, Yd, in country d is
1For example, the model incorporates several alternative forms of modelling the labour market, endoge-
nous versus exogenous household investment in children education, disaggregation into several household
income classes and others.
2For the sake of brevity, we omit time subscripts when describing static equations in this section.
3Notation: we use Latin letters for variables and Greek letters for parameters. Small Latin letters refer
to varieties, capital letters denote goods (sectors). Indices o and d denote origin and destination countries,
respectively. Indices i and j denote producing and consuming industries (which may overlap), respectively.
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composed of income from all primary factors and government transfers to households
net of taxes, To:
Yo =
F
∑
f=1
w f dFo + To (2)
where w f is the factor wage (rental rate) and Fo denotes the set of factor owned by
households (capital and several types of labour, see below).
The consumer price index, Pid, takes the same CES form in both sub-utility tiers,
therefore spelled out only for the sectoral demand:
Pid =
[
R
∑
r=1
Nioλi (pioτiod)
1−σ
] 1
1−σ
(3)
where Nio describes the mass (number) of firms exporting from the origin country o, pio
is the output price and τiod are iceberg transport costs of shipping goods produced in the
origin country, o, to the destination country, d.4
Using the price index from equation (3), consumer demand for each variety of
differentiated good i can be expressed as:
xiod = αidYdλi
(pioτiod)
−σ
P1−σid
(4)
where xiod is country d’s demand for variety x of good Xi produced in country o.
A.1.2 Production
Each firm uses two types of inputs for producing goods: intermediate goods, Xjo, and
primary factors, Ff o. The use of intermediate inputs is determined by their relative prices.
The price index for intermediate goods, Pjd, takes a CES form:
Pjd =
[
I
∑
i=1
λjP1−σid
] 1
1−σQ
(5)
where Pid is the same price index as for consumer goods, i.e. we implicitly assume
that consumers and industries demand goods in the same proportions.5 The use of
4Iceberg transportation costs, τiod, imply that (1 + τod) units of good i have to be shipped from the
origin country, o, in order for one unit to arrive at the destination country, d, (see equation 13).
5This simplifying assumption is required because of data limitations allowing to differentiate between
intermediate inputs and consumptions goods. Modelling different consumer and industry demand shares
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intermediates from own as well as other industries implies inter-industry and intra-
industry linkages. The presence of these linkages between low-skill, medium-skill and
high-skill manufacturing, together with country differences in the skill endowment, will
generate an additional channel of adjustment and imply asymmetric responses to policy
shocks across countries.
As above, also the price index of primary production factors takes the CES form:
Wio =
[
F
∑
f=1
λ fw1−σf o
] 1
1−σW
(6)
where Wio is the aggregate price for all primary factors used in the production by sector
i’s firms in country o and, as above, w f is the factor wage (rental rate).
As usual in the monopolistic competition framework, we assume that each country
contains a large number of firms, each producing a single variety, implying the following
constant mark-up equation for profit maximising firms:
pio =
σ
σ− 1MCio (7)
where MCio is the marginal cost of industry i producing in country o. The parameter
restriction σ > 1 ensures that the output price, po, is always positive. According to
equations (5) and (6), the marginal cost, MCio, is specified as a nested CES function with
two arguments: primary factors and intermediate inputs:
MCio = βio
[
δ
σMC
io P
1−σMC
jd + (1− δio)σMC W1−σMCio
] 1
1−σMC (8)
where σMC is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods and primary
factors, whereas parameter δio determines input shares of intermediate goods and primary
factors.
A.1.3 Inputs: primary and intermediary
As usual, demands for primary factors and intermediate inputs are obtained by taking
partial derivatives of the marginal cost function (equation 8) with respect to input price
indexes (equations 5 and 6) according to the Shephard’s lemma:
would solely shift within industry demand ratio, which, however, would not affect our empirical results.
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Ff o =
I
∑
i=1
β
1−σMC
io δio
[
MCio
Wio
]σMC [Wio
w f ,o
]σW
Nio (Xio + FCio) (9)
where FCio is the fixed cost.6 The labour demand for different skill levels, e, at the
second tier of the production function and demand for labour with different ethnical
backgrounds, m, at the lower tier of the production function takes the same CES form as
demand for primary factors and intermediate inputs at the upper tier.
The employed labour in each country is determined via a wage curve, which accounts
for labour market imperfections (see Kancs and Lecca 2018). Hence, the model incorpo-
rates an imperfect competition in the labour market. The general formulation, expressed
in the logarithmic form, follows Blanchflower and Oswald (1995):
woem = ξoem − ιoemuoem (10)
where ξ and ι are econometrically estimated wage curve parameters. Equation (10)
describes a conventional wage curve, as defined in Blanchflower and Oswald (1995),
according to which the real wage, woem, of m type workers with skills, e, is negatively
related to the unemployment rate, uoem.
The capital supply in each country is determined endogenously by adjusting the
capital stock such that the real rate of return to capital equals the steady state rate of
return: WkoPo = ρo, where Po is the price level in country o and ρo is the steady state rate of
return.
The demand for intermediate inputs is derived analogously to the primary factor
demand by applying the Shephard’s lemma:
Xjd =
I
∑
j=1
β
1−σMC
jd
(
1− δjd
) [MCjd
Pjd
]σMC [Pjd
Pid
]σQ
Njd
(
Xjd + FCjd
)
(11)
The industry demand for individual variety x of good Xj is analogous to the consumer
demand in equation (4):7
6The fixed cost would be set to zero and the number of firms to one, if we would model some industries
as perfectly competitive industries.
7Given that workers consume only final goods, the consumer demand function, Xid, is less involved
than Xjd, in equation (4) we have already substituted for Xid.
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xjod = Xjdλi
(
pjoτjod
)−σ
P−σjd
(12)
A.1.4 Equilibrium
The total demand for good i produced in origin country o is given by the sum of
demand for the final consumption and demand for the intermediate use:
Xiod =
R
∑
r=1
(
xiod + xjod
)
(1 + τod) (13)
The labour market equilibrium is ensured through endogenous adjustments in the
unemployment rate:
∑
i
NioLioem= (1− uoem) Loem (14)
The long-run equilibrium also requires that the number of firms in each country is no
longer changing in response to short-run profits, which implies zero profits wherever
there is a positive number of firms and negative profits (for potential, if not for actual,
firms) wherever the number of firms is zero:
MCid (Xid + FCi) ≥ pidXid (15)
As usual, the firm entry and exit is free, as economic sectors are modelled as imper-
fectly competitive.8 The number of manufacturing varieties produced in country r equals
the number of firms operating in country r, which is defined by the zero profit condition:
piid =
[
pidXid −MCid
(
Xid + FCj
)]
Nid = 0 (16)
A.2 Model calibration
The model economy is represented by five EU Member States: Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, the rest of the EU and the rest of the world.
Each EU Member State’s economy of the five studied countries is composed of a number
of economic sectors. In order to account for differences in the skill intensity between eco-
nomic sectors and hence structural differences between the five studied countries, in the
8As noted above, if modelling some sectors as perfectly competitive, the fixed cost would be set to zero
and the number of firms would equal to one.
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Table 1: Calibrated shares of economic sectors in the five study countries, 2014
Bulgaria Czechia Hungary Romania Slovakia
High-skill manufacturing 0.097 0.133 0.156 0.070 0.075
Medium-skill manufacturing 0.149 0.435 0.414 0.352 0.442
Low-skill manufacturing 0.051 0.086 0.041 0.073 0.081
Education 0.039 0.040 0.051 0.034 0.041
Rest of the economy 0.665 0.306 0.339 0.472 0.361
Source: Authors’ calibration of the model.
present study each EU Member State’s economy is disaggregated into five economic sec-
tors: Low-skill manufacturing; Medium-skill manufacturing; High-skill manufacturing;
Education and the Rest of the economy.
The classification of the first three economic sectors (low-skill, medium-skill and high-
skill manufacturing) follows the skill and technology-intensity product definition from
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).9 The UNCTAD’s
classification distinguishes products according to their level of skill- and technology-
intensity; all products are regrouped into seven categories: (i) High skill- and technology
intensive manufactures; (ii) Medium skill- and technology intensive manufactures; (iii)
Low skill- and technology intensive manufactures; (iv) Resource-intensive manufactures;
(v) Non-fuel primary commodities; (vi) Mineral fuels; and (vii) Unclassified products.
For the purpose of the present study, we make use of the first three categories ((i)-(iii)),
other four groups are aggregated together in a ’Rest of the economy’ aggregate. Further,
SITC Revision 2 product data are converted into NACE Rev. 2 industry data using United
Nations Statistics Division and Eurostat Ramon correspondence tables (see Tables A1-A3).
The Education sector corresponds to the NACE Rev. 2 Division 85 ’Education’. In the
Rest of the economy sector all other economic activities and services from NACE Rev. 2
Divisions 01-16, 19, 31, 33-84, 86-99 are aggregated together.
The relative importance of each of the five economic sectors in the GDP in each
study country is reported in Table 1. According to Table 1, the share of the high-skill
manufacturing sector in the GDP is the lowest in Romania (7%) whereas it is the highest
in Hungary (15.6%). The GDP share of the medium-skill manufacturing sector varies
between 14.9% in Bulgaria to 44.2% in Slovakia. The low-skill manufacturing sector is
relatively smaller in all five countries, ranging from 4.1% in Hungary to 8.6% in the Czech
9http://www.unctad.info/en/trade-analysis-branch/data-and-statistics/other-databases/
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Table 2: Concordance between ISCED education levels and skill levels in the model
ISCED Model
Code Label Skill-level
0 Pre-primary education Low-skill
1 Primary education or first stage of basic education Low-skill
2 Lower secondary education or second stage of basic education Low-skill
3 Upper secondary education Medium-skill
4 Post-secondary non tertiary education Medium-skill
5 First stage of tertiary education* High-skill
6 Second stage of tertiary education** High-skill
Source: Based on the UNESCO’s International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) definition. Notes: In line with the
OECD, the primary and lower secondary education (ISCED 0-2) corresponds to low-skills; the upper-secondary and post-secondary
education (ISCED 3-4) corresponds to medium-skills; and the tertiary education (ISCED 5-6) corresponds to high-skills. *not leading
directly to an advanced research qualification; **leading to an advanced research qualification.
Republic. The relative size of the education sector is rather similar across the five study
countries, ranging from 3.4% in Romania to 5.1% in Hungary. Finally, the relative size of
the ’Rest of the economy’ sector that aggregates all other economic activities and services
is determined by the relative size of the low-, medium- and high-skill manufacturing and
education services in these countries (Table 1).
In order to account for differences in the education intensity between worker skill
levels and hence differences in the workforce structure between the five studied countries,
in the model labour is disaggregated according to skill levels into three skill categories:
low-skill, medium-skill and high-skill. The skill aggregation follows the UNESCO’s
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED): the primary and lower
secondary education (ISCED 0-2) corresponds to low-skills; the upper-secondary and
postsecondary education (ISCED 3-4) corresponds to medium-skills; and the tertiary
education (ISCED 5-6) corresponds to high-skills. See Table 2 for concordance between
the ISCED categories and those adopted in the model.
The calibrated shares of the labour workforce by the educational attainment level in
each study country in 2014 are reported in Table 3. According to Table 3, the highest share
of low-skill workers (ISCED 0-2) is in Romania (29.75%), followed by Bulgaria (20.55%).
The lowest share of low-skill workers is in the Czech Republic (8.35%). As regards
medium-skill workers (ISCED 3-4), they their share ranges from 54.35% in Bulgaria to
71.30% in the Czech Republic. The relative size of the high-skill workforce is the most
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Table 3: Calibrated shares of the labour workforce by the educational attainment level in the five study
countries, 2014
Bulgaria Czechia Hungary Romania Slovakia
Low-skill 0.21 0.08 0.19 0.30 0.11
Medium-skill 0.54 0.71 0.59 0.56 0.69
High-skill 0.25 0.20 0.22 0.14 0.20
Source: Authors’ calibration of the model.
homogenous across the five study countries. It ranges from 14.20% in Romania to 25.10%
in Bulgaria (Table 3). It has to be noted that differences in the education quality are not
captured in these statistics. They may be significant though and offer a promising area
for a future research.
In addition to the construction of the base year data (2014) base, a further important
step of the empirical implementation of the model is model’s parameterisation, i.e. assign-
ing numerical values to all model parameters. As usual in applied general equilibrium
models, part of parameter values are based on econometric estimates (either own or
from the literature), whereas the other part is calibrated within the model. In particular,
all elasticities of substitution/transformation are based on econometric estimates. In
the present study, we assume a rather low elasticity of substitution in production (0.4)
(Chirinko 2008), a relatively high elasticity of substitution in consumption (1.5) (Okagawa
and Ban 2008) and a fairly high for trade between countries (6.0) (Aspalter 2016). The
elasticity of substitution between different types of skills equate to 2.0 (Krussel et al. 2000),
while the elasticity of substitution between Roma and non-Roma workers equate to 6.0,
which corresponds to elasticity estimates between foreign-born and native-born workers
of Ottaviano and Peri (2012). As for the wage curve parameterisation, we typically
assume a long-run wage curve, implying a wage elasticity equal to -0.1 (Nijkamp and
Poot 2005).10 The interest rate (faced by producers, consumers and investors) follows
the European Commission’s Better Regulation Guidelines and is set to 0.04,11 the rate of
depreciation to 0.15.
The rest of model parameters, notably, shift and share parameters are calibrated
within the model such as to reproduce exactly each study country’s base year (2014) data
10Most of previous studies on the relationship between unemployment and wages find an elasticity close
to -0.1, as summarised by the meta-analysis carried out by Nijkamp and Poot (2005). This confirms the
original estimates of Blanchflower and Oswald (1995).
11https://ec.europa.eu/info/better-regulation-guidelines-and-toolbox_en
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Table 4: Calibrated shares of main macro-economic variables in the five study countries, 2014
Bulgaria Czechia Hungary Romania Slovakia
Exports/GDP 0.65 0.83 0.88 0.41 0.92
Imports/GDP 0.66 0.76 0.81 0.42 0.88
Value added/GDP 0.87 0.90 0.84 0.89 0.91
Labour/GDP 0.41 0.40 0.43 0.33 0.38
Investment/GDP 0.21 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.22
Source: Authors’ calibration of the model.
in national accounts. The model calibration process assumes study country economies
being in a steady-state equilibrium initially. This implies that the data observed should
provide an unbiased information about preferences and technologies in each country
and therefore relative magnitudes should not vary in the baseline. The capital stock is
calibrated to allow depreciation to be fully covered by investments.
For illustrative purposes, selected calibrated share parameters are reported in Table
4. If the theoretical model is specified correctly, then the reproduction of the base year
equilibrium is ensured by construction, which is the case of the underlying model.
Comparing the calibrated shares in the model with those of the Eurostat’s national
account data, we can observe that the model is able to reproduce exactly the statistical
base year data. Although not a sufficient condition, it is a necessary condition to check
that the model is correctly specified and parameterised. The General Algebraic Modeling
System (GAMS) programme that is used to solve the model allows to check for this
in many other ways. For example, in order to ensure that there are no errors in the
calibration of the model, we solve the model with zero iterations.
Further, it is important to note that, apart from the above explained baseline scenario
assumptions with respect to the population growth, we do not make any further assump-
tions about the future development of the EU economy, i.e. how would it develop in
absence of the integration policy. Hence, all results reported above are deviations off the
baseline, i.e. we compare different policy scenarios with the baseline scenario without
policy interventions; difference between the two is then attributed to the particular policy
that is simulated.
In order to ensure the robustness of the underlying modelling framework, a further
step is the model validation. However, given that the model is designed as an impact
assessment model for undertaking what if type of analysis, but not as a forecasting tool,
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the validation of an applied general equilibrium model using historical data is extremely
challenging. Among others, because we cannot observe the true impact of a particular
policy simulated by the model. We can only observe the historical development of
certain variables, in which however the true policy impact is confounded by many other
simultaneous developments, such as financial crisis, oil price shock, etc. These conceptual
limitations are important to bear in mind, when considering and interpreting simulation
results produced by any applied general equilibrium model, including the present one.
They suggest that, whereas these type of models can be useful for understanding the
direction and underlying mechanics of impacts, the exact magnitude of true effects may
be different from those projected in model simulations.
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Table A.1: Concordance between SITC Rev. 3 products and NACE Rev. 2 industries: Low-skill manufac-
turing
SITC Revision 3 NACE Revision 2
Code Label Code Label
511 Hydrocarbons, n.e.s., halogenated,
nitr. derivative
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
512 Alcohols, phenols, halogenat., sul-
fonat., nitrat. der.
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
513 Carboxylic acids, anhydrides,
halides, per.; derivati.
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
514 Nitrogen-function compounds 20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
515 Organo-inorganic, heterocycl.
compounds, nucl. acids
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
516 Other organic chemicals 20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
522 Inorganic chemical elements, ox-
ides, halogen salts
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
523 Metallic salts, peroxysalts, of inor-
ganic acids
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
524 Other inorganic chemicals 20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
525 Radio-actives and associated ma-
terials
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
531 Synth. organic colouring matter,
colouring lakes
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
532 Dyeing, tanning extracts, synth.
tanning materials
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
533 Pigments, paints, varnishes and
related materials
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
541 Medicinal and pharmaceutical
products, excluding 542
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceu-
tical products and pharmaceutical
preparations
542 Medicaments (incl. veterinary
medicaments)
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceu-
tical products and pharmaceutical
preparations
551 Essential oils, perfume, flavour
materials
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
553 Perfumery, cosmetics or toilet
prepar. (excluding soaps)
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
554 Soaps, cleansing and polishing
preparations
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
562 Fertilizers (other than those of
group 272)
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
571 Polymers of ethylene, in primary
forms
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
572 Polymers of styrene, in primary
forms
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
573 Polymers of vinyl chloride or halo-
genated olefins
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
574 Polyethers, epoxide resins; poly-
carbonat., polyesters
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
575 Other plastics, in primary forms 20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
579 Waste, parings and scrap, of plas-
tics
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
581 Tubes, pipes and hoses of plastics 22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic
products
582 Plates, sheets, films, foil, strip, of
plastics
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic
products
SITC Revision 3 NACE Revision 2
Code Label Code Label
583 Monofilaments, of plastics, cross-
section > 1mm
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic
products
591 Insectides, similar products, for
retail sale
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
592 Starche, wheat gluten; albu-
minoidal substances; glues
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
593 Explosives and pyrotechnic prod-
ucts
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
597 Prepared addit. for miner. oils;
lubricat., de-icing
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
598 Miscellaneous chemical products,
n.e.s.
20 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
751 Office machines 28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
752 Automatic data processing ma-
chines, n.e.s.
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
759 Parts, accessories for machines of
groups 751, 752
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
761 Television receivers, whether or
not combined
26 Manufacture of computer, elec-
tronic and optical products
762 Radio-broadcast receivers,
whether or not combined
26 Manufacture of computer, elec-
tronic and optical products
763 Sound recorders or reproducers 26 Manufacture of computer, elec-
tronic and optical products
764 Telecommunication equipment,
n.e.s.;, parts, n.e.s.
26 Manufacture of computer, elec-
tronic and optical products
776 Cathode valves, tubes 28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
792 Aircraft, associated equipment;
spacecraft, etc.
30 Manufacture of other transport
equipment
871 Optical instruments, apparatus,
n.e.s.
26 Manufacture of computer, elec-
tronic and optical products
872 Instruments, appliances, n.e.s., for
medical, etc.
26 Manufacture of computer, elec-
tronic and optical products
873 Meters, counters, n.e.s. 26 Manufacture of computer, elec-
tronic and optical products
874 Measuring, analysing, controlling
apparatus, n.e.s.
26 Manufacture of computer, elec-
tronic and optical products
881 Photographic apparatus, equip-
ment, n.e.s.
26 Manufacture of computer, elec-
tronic and optical products
882 Cinematographic, photographic
supplies
26 Manufacture of computer, elec-
tronic and optical products
883 Cinematograph films, exposed,
developed
26 Manufacture of computer, elec-
tronic and optical products
884 Optical goods, n.e.s. 26 Manufacture of computer, elec-
tronic and optical products
885 Watches, clocks 26 Manufacture of computer, elec-
tronic and optical products
891 Arms, ammunition 25 Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, except machinery and
equipment
892 Printed matter 18 Printing and reproduction of
recorded media
896 Works of art, collectors’ pieces, an-
tiques
32 Other manufacturing
897 Jewellery, articles of precious ma-
teria., n.e.s.
32 Other manufacturing
Source: Based on the United Nations Statistics Division and Eurostat Ramon correspondence tables.
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Table A.2: Concordance between SITC Rev. 3 products and NACE Rev. 2 industries: Medium-skill
manufacturing
SITC Revision 3 NACE Revision 2
Code Label Code Label
621 Materials of rubber (pastes, plates,
sheets, etc.)
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic
products
625 Rubber tyres, tyre treads or flaps,
inner tubes
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic
products
629 Articles of rubber, n.e.s. 22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic
products
711 Vapour generating boilers, auxil-
iary plant; parts
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, except machinery and
equipment
712 Steam turbines, other vapour
turbin., parts, n.e.s.
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, except machinery and
equipment
713 Internal combustion piston en-
gines, parts, n.e.s.
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
714 Engines, motors, non-electric;
parts, n.e.s.
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
716 Rotating electric plant, parts
thereof, n.e.s.
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
718 Other power generating machin-
ery, parts, n.e.s.
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
721 Agricultural machinery (exclud-
ing tractors), parts
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
722 Tractors (excluding those of 71414,
74415)
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
723 Civil engineering, contractors’
plant, equipment
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
724 Textile, leather machinery, parts
thereof, n.e.s.
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
725 Paper mill, pulp mill machinery;
paper articles man.
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
726 Printing, bookbinding machinery,
parts thereof
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
727 Food-processing machines (ex-
cluding domestic)
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
728 Other machinery for particular in-
dustries, n.e.s.
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
731 Machine-tools working by remov-
ing material
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
733 Mach.-tools for working metal, ex-
cluding removing mate.
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
735 Parts, n.e.s., accessories for ma-
chines of 731, 733
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
737 Metalworking machinery (exclud-
ing machine-tools), parts
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
741 Heating, cooling equipment, parts
thereof, n.e.s.
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, except machinery and
equipment
742 Pumps for liquids 28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
743 Pumps (excluding liquid), gas
compressors, fans; centr.
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
744 Mechanical handling equipment,
parts, n.e.s.
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
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SITC Revision 3 NACE Revision 2
Code Label Code Label
745 Other non-electr. machinery, tools,
mechan. appar.
28 Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
746 Ball or roller bearings 25 Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, except machinery and
equipment
747 Appliances for pipes, boiler shells,
tanks, vats, etc.
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, except machinery and
equipment
748 Transmis. shafts 25 Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, except machinery and
equipment
749 Non-electric parts, accessor. of
machinery, n.e.s.
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, except machinery and
equipment
771 Electric power machinery, and
parts thereof
27 Manufacture of electrical equip-
ment
772 Apparatus for electrical circuits;
board, panels
27 Manufacture of electrical equip-
ment
773 Equipment for distributing elec-
tricity, n.e.s.
27 Manufacture of electrical equip-
ment
774 Electro-diagnostic appa. for medi-
cal sciences, etc.
27 Manufacture of electrical equip-
ment
775 Household type equipment, elec-
trical or not, n.e.s.
27 Manufacture of electrical equip-
ment
778 Electrical machinery, apparatus,
n.e.s.
27 Manufacture of electrical equip-
ment
781 Motor vehicles for the transport
of persons
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles,
trailers and semi-trailers
782 Motor vehic. for transport of
goods, special purpo.
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles,
trailers and semi-trailers
783 Road motor vehicles, n.e.s. 29 Manufacture of motor vehicles,
trailers and semi-trailers
784 Parts, accessories of vehicles of
722, 781, 782, 783
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles,
trailers and semi-trailers
811 Prefabricated buildings 23 Manufacture of other non-metallic
mineral products
812 Sanitary, plumbing, heating fix-
tures, fittings, n.e.s.
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic
mineral products
813 Lighting fixtures, fittings, n.e.s. 27 Manufacture of electrical equip-
ment
893 Articles, n.e.s., of plastics 22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic
products
894 Baby carriages, toys, games, sport-
ing goods
32 Other manufacturing
Source: Based on the United Nations Statistics Division and Eurostat Ramon correspondence tables.
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Table A.3: Concordance between SITC Rev. 3 products and NACE Rev. 2 industries: Low-skill manufac-
turing
SITC Revision 3 NACE Revision 2
Code Label Code Label
671 Pig iron, spiegeleisen, sponge
iron, powder, granu
24 Manufacture of basic metals
672 Ingots, primary forms, of iron or
steel; semi-finis.
24 Manufacture of basic metals
673 Flat-rolled prod., iron, non-alloy
steel, not coated
24 Manufacture of basic metals
674 Flat-rolled prod., iron, non-alloy
steel, coated, clad
24 Manufacture of basic metals
675 Flat-rolled products of alloy steel 24 Manufacture of basic metals
676 Iron, steel bars, rods, angles,
shapes, sections
24 Manufacture of basic metals
677 Rails, railway track construction
mat., iron, steel
24 Manufacture of basic metals
678 Wire of iron or steel 24 Manufacture of basic metals
679 Tubes, pipes, hollow profiles, fit-
tings, iron, steel
24 Manufacture of basic metals
691 Structures, parts, n.e.s., of iron,
steel, aluminium
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, except machinery and
equipment
692 Metal containers for storage or
transport
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, except machinery and
equipment
693 Wire products (excluding electri-
cal) and fencing grills
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, except machinery and
equipment
694 Nails, screws, nuts, bolts, rivets,
the like, of metal
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, except machinery and
equipment
695 Tools for use in the hand or in
machine
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, except machinery and
equipment
696 Cutlery 25 Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, except machinery and
equipment
697 Household equipment of base
metal, n.e.s.
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, except machinery and
equipment
699 Manufactures of base metal, n.e.s. 25 Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, except machinery and
equipment
785 Motorcycles, cycles 30 Manufacture of other transport
equipment
786 Trailers, semi-trailers 29 Manufacture of motor vehicles,
trailers and semi-trailers
791 Railway vehicles, associated
equipment
30 Manufacture of other transport
equipment
793 Ships, boats, floating structures 30 Manufacture of other transport
equipment
895 Office, stationery supplies, n.e.s. 17 Manufacture of paper and paper
products
Source: Based on the United Nations Statistics Division and Eurostat Ramon correspondence tables.
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